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Projected Patriotism and Its Determinants

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Abstract

These findings highlight the importance of Projected Patriotism in shaping attitudes toward migrants, particularly in how perceptions of voluntariness influence sympathy and judgment. While existing research has focused extensively on one's own attachment to the nation—ranging from blind loyalty to constructive critique - less is known about the normative expectations people hold about others' patriotic feelings. This paper introduces Projected Patriotism, defined as the belief that outgroup members, especially migrants, ought to exhibit patriotic attachment to their country of origin. I hypothesize that Projected Patriotism operates as a distinct, outward-facing dimension of national identification, shaped by symbolic attachments and political context, and that exposure to elite threat rhetoric increases its expression. The study tests these hypotheses in two diverse national contexts: the United States, a developed liberal democracy with institutionalized refugee vetting, and Turkey, a developing country facing large-scale, visible refugee arrivals linked to regional instability. Quantitative analysis reveals that Projected Patriotism is moderately correlated with Blind Patriotism but remains conceptually distinct, reflecting moral expectations rather than personal loyalty. Elite rhetoric framing refugees as threats - economic and cultural in the U.S., security and economic in Turkey - significantly heightens levels of Projected Patriotism. Furthermore, stronger affective attachment to national symbols consistently predicts greater endorsement of Projected Patriotism across both contexts. These findings have important implications for understanding attitudes toward migration voluntariness. Individuals high in Projected Patriotism may be more inclined to question the deservingness of refugees when their flight is viewed as a voluntary choice rather than an involuntary necessity. This highlights Projected Patriotism as a contextually responsive and symbolically grounded attitude that shapes public opinion about migrants' loyalty and worthiness, offering important contributions to scholarship on national identity, migration politics, and political polarization across varied political settings.

1 Introduction

In early 2022, Maksim Chmerkovskiy—a Ukrainian-American and internationally recognized celebrity dancer best known for his long-running role on Dancing with the Stars—found himself in Kyiv when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In the days that followed, Chmerkovskiy used his Instagram account to document his harrowing experience attempting to flee the country, including chaotic scenes at the train station, limited access to transportation, and the emotional weight of abandoning a nation under attack. After eventually crossing into Poland, he safely returned to the United States. Despite his civilian status and lack of military background, Chmerkovskiy became the target of substantial online criticism. Social media users and commenters accused him of "fleeing" rather than fighting, with some suggesting that his departure represented a betrayal of Ukraine and its people. The backlash was particularly notable given Chmerkovskiy's public visibility and fame; rather than shielding him from critique, his celebrity status seemingly amplified the expectation that he should have embodied patriotic sacrifice.

This episode offers a revealing parallel to broader public discourses around refugees in conflict settings—especially those in Turkey. For example, a widely circulated petition on Change.org titled "Syrian male refugees in Turkey who are between the ages of 18 and 45 should be deployed and fight for Syria" garnered over 290,000 signatures, predominantly from Turkish citizens. The petition accused Syrian refugees of "betraying their country" and framed their presence in Turkey not as a result of forced displacement, but as a moral failing. In demanding that these refugees return to Syria to fight, the petition not only advocated for their expulsion but also invoked a deeply patriotic logic: those fleeing should

be expected to return to their homeland to defend it. This framing has been echoed in street interviews, social media discourse, and political rhetoric in Turkey, where refugees are often singled out and blamed for their perceived passivity.

Chmerkovskiy's case and the discourse surrounding Syrian refugees in Turkey reveal a consistent pattern: displaced individuals are frequently denied the social legitimacy of victimhood. Instead, they are constructed as failed citizens, whose flight is interpreted as a deliberate rejection of national duty. In both cases, public expectations are shaped by nationalist ideologies that see the act of leaving as inherently suspect—especially when individuals are able-bodied and capable of fighting. These responses also suggest that public attitudes toward refugees are not driven solely by concerns about economic burden or cultural difference, but by normative expectations about who deserves protection and who should be fighting. Whether the individual in question is an anonymous refugee or a globally recognized performer, the discourse reveals how nationalism intersects with perceptions of displacement, agency, and moral obligation.

While the petition and street interviews in Turkey are part of a larger discourse in the country, they also reflect a broader, transnational narrative. For example, Miloš Zeman, the former president of the Czech Republic, remarked that "a large majority of illegal migrants are young, healthy, and single men. I wonder why these men are not taking up arms to fight for the freedom of their countries against the Islamic State." Similar sentiments can be seen in the backlash against Ukrainian refugees. Anti-Ukrainian rhetoric often includes accusations that men fleeing Ukraine are cowards, particularly in light of the Ukrainian government's decision to restrict the movement of men aged 18-60, barring them from leaving the country

during the war (Gruzd, Mai and Taleb, 2024). These criticisms parallel the accusations faced by Syrian refugees (Rettberg and Gajjala, 2016), highlighting a shared narrative of judgment based on perceived patriotism and gender roles.

The recurring elements of patriotism in these discourses, as used by politicians and reinforced by certain audiences, suggest the emergence of a new form of patriotism. This concept appears to extend loyalty expectations to the citizens of other countries, influencing attitudes toward refugees in unprecedented ways. I propose that the shaming of refugees fleeing conflict may be a manifestation of what I term "Projected Patriotism." This new form of patriotism expects individuals of other countries to uphold a sense of national duty, even when they are forced to flee. Given the staggering number of displaced people globally, with over 100 million forcibly displaced between 2010 and 2019[1], understanding how these perceptions are formed is crucial.

These examples offer a compelling perspective when examined in the context of existing research on voluntary versus involuntary migration. Historically, scholarly literature has suggested that refugees who are forced to flee their countries due to persecution, violence, or other life-threatening circumstances tend to receive more sympathy. This is largely because their displacement is seen as involuntary, with no choice but to leave behind everything they know to survive. In contrast, migrants who choose to move for economic opportunities or personal reasons are often viewed with less empathy, as their decision to leave is considered voluntary. However, the cases explored here present a challenge to this traditional understanding. They suggest that, in practice, sympathy for refugees may not be as auto-

[1]https://www.unhcr.org/flagship-reports/globaltrends/globaltrends2019/

matic or universally extended as the literature often implies. Instead, the level of empathy shown towards refugees can be shaped by various factors, including public attitudes, political rhetoric, and national identity. This calls into question the assumption that refugees are always viewed primarily as victims deserving of compassion, highlighting the complexities and nuances in how displaced individuals are perceived across different contexts.

I propose that, for some individuals, forced displacement may not be viewed as an entirely involuntary act, which can result in negative perceptions of refugees. This is particularly true when local populations hold refugees partly responsible for the circumstances that led to their displacement, especially when these views are framed within the context of patriotism. There seems to be an expectation that refugees should exhibit loyalty to their home countries by fighting or staying to defend their homeland, even in the face of violence or persecution. In essence, these individuals project their own sense of patriotism onto refugees, holding them to the same standards of national duty they themselves may uphold. This projection leads to a belief that refugees should actively fulfill these patriotic obligations, even when their displacement is driven by forces beyond their control.

Who, then, embraces the concept of Projected Patriotism? As with any evolving idea that takes root over time, it is difficult to pinpoint its exact determinants. That said, I argue that external factors—such as elite rhetoric surrounding refugees—can play a crucial role in how individuals adopt Projected Patriotism. When political leaders and influential figures frame refugee issues in particular ways, they can amplify the salience of these issues in the public consciousness. This heightened focus can trigger feelings of threat, particularly concerning national security, economic stability, and cultural identity. Such rhetoric, often

imbued with nationalistic undertones, can lead individuals to project their own ideas of patriotism onto refugees, expecting them to meet certain perceived national duties. In this way, elite discourse does not merely reflect public sentiment, but actively shapes and reinforces it, influencing how people interpret and react to the presence of refugees within their societies. In addition to examining elite discourse, I also explore the relationship between Projected Patriotism and two widely studied types of patriotism: blind patriotism and constructive patriotism. Furthermore, I investigate the role of attachment to national symbols, which has been identified as a central mechanism in patriotism literature. This aspect of my analysis seeks to position projected patriotism within the broader framework of existing related definitions and concepts, rather than making a direct causal claim. By doing so, I aim to provide a deeper understanding of projected patriotism's place within the larger landscape of patriotic attitudes, while also laying the groundwork for examining the causal effects of elite rhetoric on it.

This study addresses several gaps in the existing literature. First, it revisits some of the assumptions about different "types" of migration. Typically, the literature categorizes migration into two broad types when examining attitudes: voluntary and involuntary Lynn and Lea (2003); Verkuyten, Mepham and Kros (2018). Research generally suggests that refugees, as part of involuntary migration, tend to receive more favorable reactions than those migrating for economic opportunities Verkuyten, Mepham and Kros (2018); Alrababa'h et al. (2021); Arias and Blair (2022); Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner (2016). However, the notion of "voluntariness" in migration and forced displacement is more nuanced than it first appears. I argue that the distinction between voluntary and involuntary migration is highly

context-dependent and not as straightforward as commonly portrayed. For instance, what is typically considered involuntary migration, such as fleeing from war or persecution, may not always be viewed as such by the host population. This misperception can lead to negative attitudes towards refugees, contrary to what might be expected. In some cases, even fleeing a catastrophic event like war may be regarded as a voluntary decision, as some anecdotal accounts suggest, thus complicating our understanding of how migrants are perceived by the receiving society.

This nuanced perspective calls for a rethinking of how host populations perceive migrants. The introduction of the concept of Projected Patriotism provides a useful lens for understanding this complexity, shedding light on the variety of individual attitudes within the host society. Projected Patriotism helps explain why certain members of the host population might view refugees who have fled conflict zones with skepticism or disapproval, interpreting their flight as a failure to fulfill what they perceive as a patriotic duty to defend their homeland. This framework highlights the importance of recognizing how differing interpretations of voluntariness and patriotism can shape public perceptions of migrants. It reveals that attitudes towards refugees are more varied and complex than previously acknowledged, reflecting a broader spectrum of opinions than often assumed. Introduction of the concept of Projected Patriotism is also particularly useful, considering the lack of emphasis on the question of "what citizens of other countries ought to do?" from a patriotism perspective in the literature, across several definitions of patriotism, which are only concerned with the country of the patriot themselves.

Lastly, existing literature predominantly centers on developed countries, with only a

few exceptions (Getmansky, Sınmazdemir and Zeitzoff, 2018). While much of the research on refugee attitudes has been conducted within Western contexts like the United States, this study also focuses on Turkey—a developing country that hosts a significant number of refugees, particularly from Syria and, more recently, Ukraine. Despite the extensive research on refugee attitudes in developed nations, developing countries have received comparatively little attention in this regard, even though 83 percent of refugees are hosted in low- and middle-income countries [2]. Developed and developing countries are often seen as having distinct mechanisms when it comes to refugee perceptions, particularly along economic and cultural lines Alrababa'h et al. (2021). In addition to focusing on Turkey as a developing country, the choice of both the United States and Turkey—countries that host moderate to high numbers of refugees—provides a valuable contrast. This variation is important for exploring the key concept in this paper, as it allows for a comparison between different types of refugee-hosting contexts.

To address the research question, I conducted survey experiments in both the United States and Turkey. The findings indicate that elite rhetoric emphasizing the threats associated with potential refugees can indeed increase individuals' levels of projected patriotism. In addition to economic threat, which emerged as a common factor influencing perceptions in both countries, cultural threat was particularly effective in the United States, outperforming the placebo condition. In contrast, in Turkey, security threat had a stronger impact. This difference highlights the contextual nuances between the two countries, suggesting that the type of threat triggering projected patriotism can vary based on the specific socio-political environment. Overall, the results emphasize the significant role that threat-related messages

[2]https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/

play in shaping attitudes towards refugees.

The upcoming chapters are organized as follows: in the next chapter, I will provide a comprehensive review of the literature, focusing on existing definitions of patriotism and nationalism, and exploring how these two interconnected concepts have been examined in relation to attitudes toward refugees and migrants. In the theoretical chapter, I will introduce the concept of Projected Patriotism, offering an in-depth discussion of its theoretical underpinnings, and outlining the hypotheses regarding its potential determinants. Following this, I will describe the research design I employed for this study. In the subsequent empirical chapter, I will present the results of my tests of these hypotheses, followed by a detailed discussion of the findings.

2 Literature Review

Before introducing Projected Patriotism, we need to understand how nationalism and patriotism have been defined and the debates surrounding it in the literature. Patriotism and nationalism are related but distinct. Nationalism often emphasizes an ethnocentric pride or exclusivist identity implying superiority, which can sometimes lead to hostility toward outgroups or those perceived as "outsiders" to the nation (). In contrast, patriotism is generally seen as love for one's country, tied to a sense of civic pride and positive regard for its ideals, often with an emphasis on democratic values . While there is not a single definition the literature agrees on, arguably there is a consensus that it describes some sort of duty of sacrificing oneself for the group they belong, stemming from a sense of loyalty and connection. For the most part, the group corresponds to the individual's nation, although there have been attempts to relax it more recently. Theorizing patriotism has been a challenge since

many thinkers viewed it as insufficient as a philosophy Canovan (2000), or perceived it as comparable to racism Gomberg (1990). One of the pillars of patriotism that led thinkers to overlook it, according to its critics, is its exclusionary tendency that excludes others who do not belong to that specific political community Sardoč (2020). This, unequivocally, makes patriotism subjective in their eyes Nathanson (2020). To deal with its exclusionary nature, there have been recent attempts to theorize patriotism more thoroughly. This new wave of literature produced several sub-definitions of patriotism including constitutional patriotism Müller (2006), moderate patriotism Nathanson (1989), democratic patriotism, and critical patriotism Merry (2009), blind and constructive patriotism Schatz, Staub and Lavine (1999) among others. Going into detail about each definition would not be in the scope of this work. The main idea behind this proliferation is to understand the degree of how strict people's understanding of patriotism is when it comes to who belongs to the group they should sacrifice for (ethnic, citizenship ties, or "people of world" as is the case in cosmopolitan patriotism), what should be the sacrifice, both on the negative (e.g., dying during a war) and positive (e.g., contributing to society by social programs) ends, and what are the conditions under which patriotic duties should be at place, if there are any (e.g., duties should be served no matter what as in blind patriotism, or they are rather determined depending on certain attributes of the entity as in critical patriotism). These attempts not only try to build a more ethically defensible patriotism but also help us understand how individuals view and apply patriotism in a much wider scope.

Individuals' identification with nationalism and patriotism imply different attitudinal outcomes when it comes to migrant and/or refugee attitudes. Nationalism suggests a strong

preference for preserving national homogeneity while highlighting distinctions from other nations. In this perspective on nationhood, citizens are bound by a shared cultural heritage or ancestry, and immigrants are often perceived as "outsiders" who may disrupt national unity. Consequently, support for nationalism is consistently linked to unfavorable attitudes toward immigration (Coenders, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2017; Blank and Schmidt, 2003). Patriotism, by contrast, signifies pride and loyalty for one's country, which can also include its political institutions, such as democracy (Elkins and de Figueiredo, 2003). It involves a positive view of the country that does not rely on comparing it to others (Mummendey, Klink and Brown, 2001). This form of attachment aligns well with tolerance for immigrant groups and democratic ideals, including integrating minorities into the national community. Studies frequently find that patriotic attachment is either unrelated to attitudes on immigration Elkins and de Figueiredo (2003) or even associated with supportive views on immigration (Blank and Schmidt, 2003).Wagner et al. (2012) argue that endorsement of democratic values, like pride in the welfare system and democratic institutions, are core aspects of patriotism that can reduce negative views on immigration. However, pride in one's nation also involves attachment to it, which explains why patriotism often shows a positive correlation with nationalism (Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989). Despite the fact that these efforts attempt to widen the much narrower initial definition of patriotism by opening the way to include others, one aspect of patriotism still remains unexplored, independent of how the constituents are determined: Is there any perceived duty for members of other groups that they are supposed to satisfy? To put more concretely, should citizens be patriotic for their own country according to citizens of another country? Patriotism literature so far deals with how to define the terms of specific relationship between one or their compatriots and

their own country. However, this excludes the fact that people can actually take into consideration the patriotic relationship between another country and its own citizens. Based on this consideration, lack of fulfilling patriotic duties towards one's own country can be perceived as a signal of lack of loyalty. This fulfillment can be expected as an act of virtue. As a result, this failure of engaging in patriotic acts can cause individuals in host population to judge, deem others in another region less deserving, which is an important driver of attitudes towards refugees with respect to humanitarian concerns as we have been observing in forced displacement context(Arias and Blair, 2022). This question is yet to be tackled despite its worthiness both in terms of ethical consistency of patriotism as a philosophy, especially for its more partial definitions and understanding the stance of people in this matter.

Anti-refugee sentiments based on Projected Patriotism present a novel form of objection. Rhetoric against refugees often argue about their negative impact on economy (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Burns and Gimpel, 2000), security Lischer (2005); Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006), or culture Loescher and Milner (2004), which are based on some utility calculation find its roots in sociotropic or egocentric approaches. Studies often use information-correcting treatments or emotion-provoking nudges to tackle these objections. On the other hand, shaming of refugees due to not staying and fighting in their countries present a moral argument, and how to effectively counter this sentiment is not immediately clear. Thus, understanding this concept and its role in attitudes towards conflict refugees would be the first step to produce research testing the effectiveness of potential interventions in mitigating associated rhetoric.

3 Theory

3.1 Concept of Projected Patriotism

Although the literature on patriotism has expanded considerably - ranging from debates about its conceptual boundaries to discussions of its moral implications - most scholarship has concentrated on how individuals relate to their own country. This focus has deepened our appreciation of patriotism as a complex, multidimensional construct, encompassing everything from unquestioning allegiance (blind patriotism) to more reflective, conditional forms of loyalty (constructive patriotism). However, an important dimension remains overlooked: what do people expect from others in their patriotic relationships? In other words, do members of one group hold expectations that members of another group should feel patriotic toward their own nation? To address this neglected aspect, I introduce the notion of Projected Patriotism—the belief that others, particularly those outside one's own group, ought to display patriotic attachment to their homeland. This is more than a personal feeling of loyalty; it is a normative stance asserting that patriotism is a virtue universally expected of all individuals. Drawing from the friendship literature (MacIntyre, 2013; Goodin, 1988), patriotism is often understood as a thick relational obligation that unites citizens through loyalty, sacrifice, and belonging. Similarly, just as people might morally judge strangers for betraying their friends, individuals may also evaluate outsiders—especially migrants or foreigners—based on whether they show allegiance to their country of origin, even when those outsiders are not part of the observer's ingroup.

Projected Patriotism operates at a fundamentally different level than traditional patriotism concepts. While blind and constructive patriotism describe a person's own feelings

toward their nation, Projected Patriotism looks outward, capturing the standards individuals use to assess others' national attachments. Importantly, holding this expectation does not require that the observer personally be highly patriotic; even those with low blind or constructive patriotism scores may believe that "everyone ought to love their own country."

At its essence, Projected Patriotism is a unidimensional construct reflecting how strongly people endorse this normative expectation. Though it overlaps somewhat with existing patriotism measures, especially those emphasizing loyalty and identity, it is distinct both in its outward focus and its moral demand. People high in Projected Patriotism do not merely notice patriotism in others - they hold that it should be present, and that its absence is subject to moral critique.

Identifying the conditions under which Projected Patriotism becomes politically relevant requires clarifying its scope. Following political science traditions on concept formation (Gerring, 1999; Goertz, 2006, 2020), scope conditions specify when and where a concept applies and can be empirically observed. I argue that two macro-level factors are particularly crucial: the salience of forced migration and prevailing public narratives about national duty. In contexts where refugees are a politically charged issue—due to their numbers, elite polarization, or media framing - people are more prone to judge newcomers based on their perceived behavior and legitimacy. Concurrently, societies that emphasize obligations such as duty, sacrifice, or compulsory service (e.g., military conscription) create a normative environment where expectations of loyalty feel natural and justified. Together, these forces shape the social contexts in which Projected Patriotism arises and influences attitudes.

Beyond its conceptual contribution, Projected Patriotism also carries significant conse-

quences. Individuals high in this belief tend to interpret refugees' actions through the lens of national loyalty, evaluating asylum seekers not solely on humanitarian grounds but also on whether they appear to honor or betray their homeland. This perspective offers new insights for political psychology and migration studies by providing a novel framework to analyze perceptions of deservingness, social integration, and the boundaries of national belonging.

3.2 Determinants of Projected Patriotism

Patriotism, along with its various expressions, emerges from a complex and multifaceted process that develops over time. This process is shaped by a combination of cognitive and genetic predispositions, exposure to political symbols, and socialization experiences within familial, social, and professional environments. These influences are often deeply intertwined, making it challenging to identify the precise factors that shape individuals' patriotic orientations, including *projected patriotism*, and the extent to which these orientations are expressed.

Given this complexity, pinpointing the exact determinants of patriotism remains an ambitious task. Nevertheless, existing research has sought to identify variables that can predict both the type and intensity of patriotic sentiment. Understanding these predictors not only enhances our knowledge of patriotism in general but also provides valuable insights into the factors that contribute specifically to projected patriotism. By examining these associations, we can better understand the social, psychological, and environmental conditions that give rise to this particular form of national identification.

The literature that focuses on understanding the correlates of patriotism considers variables such as age Conover and Feldman (1987); Huddy and Khatib (2007), ethnic and religious identification Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007), education Schatz, Staub and Lavine (1999), partisanship Conover and Feldman (1987); Davis (2007), embracing traditions and national symbols Nincic and Ramos (2012) which can be grouped as internal sources, or external sources such as globalization Norris and Inglehart (2009), income inequality Solt (2011), international conflict and security threats Listhaug (1986); Schildkraut and Furia (2003). It is necessary to discern which of these are most relevant in the case of Projected Patriotism. While numerous influences will probably be involved in the development of patriotic attitudes, isolating the determinants that are key specifically for projected patriotism is crucial both for theoretical accuracy and empirical investigation.

Projected patriotism, by definition, involves making claims about how others should demonstrate loyalty or commitment to their own national or social context. This often reflects expectations about how individuals in other countries—or different cultural settings—should behave in relation to their respective national entities. Unlike their own country, however, a projected patriot may have limited knowledge about the circumstances of those they are judging, including the individual's lived experiences or the broader social and political environment in which they exist.

What distinguishes this form of patriotism is that such judgments are often made with a sense of confidence or certainty, despite this limited understanding. A key factor behind this dynamic is the projected patriot's attachment to traditional and symbolic values, particularly

when these values are perceived as strong moral guidelines. The extent to which individuals view these values as universal standards appears to shape their willingness to extend patriotic expectations beyond their own context, reinforcing the emotional underpinnings of projected patriotism.

Symbols play a powerful role in shaping social, political, and national identities. At their core, symbols are abstract representations of groups, whether those groups are national, religious, political, ethnic, or organizational in nature Firth (2013). These symbols are not merely visual markers; they carry deeper meanings that evoke collective memories, shared values, and cultural narratives. When individuals are exposed to such symbols, they often recall these embedded meanings, triggering emotions that reinforce their connection to the group the symbol represents.

Importantly, these emotional responses are not just passive reactions — they often foster a profound sense of attachment and belonging. This emotional connection strengthens an individual's loyalty to the group, which in turn influences their sense of duty and responsibility toward it. National symbols, in particular, have been shown to play a significant role in activating these feelings, making them a potent force in shaping social and psychological behaviors Butz (2009).

For individuals who strongly identify with their national symbols — such as flags, anthems, and national colors — these symbols become powerful emotional triggers that heighten their psychological attachment to their country. This heightened identification not only reinforces a sense of pride but also influences how these individuals perceive their role as citizens. Such individuals may feel a stronger obligation to fulfill perceived duties to their nation, often

acting out of a deep emotional drive rather than a calculated assessment of circumstances.

In the context of patriotism, this symbolic attachment can shape how individuals interpret the responsibilities of others as well. Those who place a strong emphasis on their national symbols may generalize this symbolic attachment to other groups or nations. In doing so, they may expect that citizens of other countries feel an equally strong connection to their own national symbols. This assumption can lead them to believe that others are bound by similar duties of loyalty, respect, and sacrifice for their respective groups — even if the social, political, or cultural contexts differ significantly.

This projection of symbolic attachment is particularly relevant when considering Projected Patriotism. Individuals who strongly emphasize traditional symbols and values may be inclined to expect that people in other nations share the same symbolic loyalty they experience themselves. Consequently, they may judge others based on this assumed sense of identification, applying criteria shaped by their own attachment to national symbols.

For example, a person who sees reverence for the national flag as a fundamental aspect of loyalty may presume that citizens in another country should exhibit a similar reverence for their own national flag. This expectation is not necessarily based on a rational understanding of the other country's social or political landscape; rather, it stems from the individual's internalized belief that symbolic attachment is a universal aspect of group loyalty.

In this way, individuals with strong symbolic identification may extend their expectations of patriotic behavior beyond their own national context, forming judgments about how others should demonstrate their loyalty. This projection reflects a belief that national symbols hold universal significance — a belief that not only shapes their understanding of patriotism but

also informs how they evaluate others' behavior in relation to their own ideas of loyalty and duty.

Thus, I argue that individuals who prioritize national symbols and traditions as central to their patriotic ideology are more likely to assume that citizens of other nations share a similar relationship with their own symbols. This imagined symmetry, in turn, leads them to assess others based on criteria shaped by their own symbolic attachment. By viewing symbolic loyalty as a universal framework, they project their own values and expectations onto others, forming judgments that reflect their internalized understanding of national duty and identity.

H_1: National Symbols: *Respondents who state more attachment to national symbols should express a higher level of Projected Patriotism.*

A potential counter-argument to the first hypothesis is that the internal features linked to projected patriotism may, in fact, be better understood as characteristics of patriotism itself, rather than being exclusive to projected patriotism. This raises an important question: To what extent is projected patriotism distinct from patriotism as a broader concept? Put differently, are expressions of projected patriotism merely an extension of one's general patriotic tendencies, or do they represent a unique form of national attachment with distinct psychological foundations?

This perspective is plausible given that patriotism, as a concept, inherently involves feelings of loyalty, duty, and moral obligation. Such elements are often tied to ethical considerations regarding one's responsibility toward their nation. Consequently, it would not be surprising if individuals who strongly identify as patriots also expect citizens of other

countries to display similar commitments to their respective nations. This overlap between projected patriotism and broader patriotic attitudes underscores the need for a clearer distinction between the two.

The first step in addressing this question requires a precise definition of patriotism. As discussed in the previous chapter, scholars have introduced various definitions of patriotism, many of which have been empirically examined to better understand their determinants and correlates. While these definitions share some common elements, identifying which specific types of patriotism are most relevant for understanding projected patriotism is essential.

To explore this distinction, I focus on two widely recognized subtypes of patriotism: Blind patriotism and Constructive patriotism. There are two key reasons for this choice. First, blind and constructive patriotism are among the most extensively studied and well-established forms of patriotism in the literature. Their conceptual clarity and empirical backing make them suitable candidates for understanding projected patriotism. Second, these two forms of patriotism differ in ways that are particularly relevant to the underlying assumptions of projected patriotism — specifically regarding the rigidity or flexibility of patriotic expectations.

While some alternative forms of patriotism emphasize a more fluid or expansive understanding of national loyalty, these frameworks may be less applicable in the projected patriotism context. For instance, Cosmopolitan Patriotism emphasizes loyalty to a global community, promoting universal solidarity and the betterment of all people without prioritizing one nation over another Erez and Laborde (2020). Since projected patriotism, by definition, assumes a clear distinction between in-group and out-group members — with the

expectation that others maintain their own national loyalties — frameworks like cosmopolitan patriotism are less relevant to this inquiry.

In contrast, blind and constructive patriotism focus more directly on how individuals conceptualize their relationship with their country. This focus makes them especially suitable for examining projected patriotism, which assumes individuals attribute patriotic duties to citizens of other nations based on their own understanding of loyalty and national attachment.

Blind Patriotism, as described by (Staub, 1991), reflects an unwavering, inflexible attachment to one's country. Blind patriots exhibit strong loyalty that persists regardless of circumstances, often rejecting criticism of their nation even when such critique may be warranted. This form of patriotism is characterized by an idealized image of the country that demands unquestioning loyalty and unconditional support. For blind patriots, symbolic values — such as flags, anthems, and other national emblems — play a particularly significant role in reinforcing this steadfast attachment Huddy and Khatib (2007); Schatz and Staub (1997). Their understanding of patriotism is deeply rooted in symbolic loyalty, where perceived threats to these symbols are seen as challenges to their national identity.

Constructive Patriotism, on the other hand, reflects a more flexible and critical form of national attachment. Constructive patriots believe that true loyalty to one's country requires a willingness to question, critique, and improve its practices. According to (Schatz and Lavine, 2007), this form of patriotism emphasizes instrumental attachment, where the primary focus is on enhancing the nation's ability to serve the common good. Constructive patriots engage with their nation in a way that encourages reflection, accountability, and

reform, viewing these processes as essential to national progress.

Given these distinctions, there are notable parallels between symbolic attachment and the contrasting forms of blind and constructive patriotism. Individuals who strongly identify with symbolic values — such as the flag or other national emblems — are more likely to adopt the rigid, unquestioning loyalty characteristic of blind patriotism. This symbolic-driven attachment reinforces their belief in absolute national allegiance, which may translate into projected expectations about how others should display loyalty to their own nations. Conversely, constructive patriots, who emphasize critical engagement rather than symbolic reverence, are less inclined to assume that others should exhibit identical forms of loyalty or adherence to national traditions.

In light of these dynamics, I hypothesize that individuals who align with Blind patriotism are more likely to adopt Projected Patriotism compared to those who identify with Constructive Patriotism. Blind patriots' strong emotional attachment to national symbols, coupled with their tendency to expect unwavering loyalty, makes them more prone to assume that citizens of other nations should mirror these same behaviors. Constructive patriots, by contrast, are more likely to recognize variation in how individuals connect with their nations, making them less inclined to project rigid patriotic expectations onto others.

$H_{2:}$: *Projected Patriotism is more correlated with blind patriotism than constructive patriotism.*

3.3 Role of Domestic Politics and Political Elites

After developing hypotheses about the roles of attachment to national symbols and the relationship between Projected Patriotism and other types of patriotism — internal determinants that shape Projected Patriotism — this section of dissertation turns to explore external forces. These forces can also play a significant role in shaping the emergence and expression of projected patriotism. Two external factors warrant particular attention: first, the potential role of intergroup interactions, particularly in contexts of forced displacement; and second, the influence of economic, cultural and security-related concerns, often amplified by political elites as part of their political discourse, which may drive the formation of projected patriotism.

Intergroup resentment is frequently leveraged by political leaders for electoral gain, particularly in contexts where tensions between different social or ethnic groups are prevalent. Research has shown that resentment between groups is often instrumentalized by politicians to consolidate voter support and mobilize public opinion Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers (2002). While the use of race-based resentment is more prominent in countries like the United States Knuckey and Kim (2015), resentment toward immigrants, particularly refugees, has become increasingly salient in Europe. This has been especially true in the context of rising populist movements and protest voting, which has seen significant growth in democracies across the continent Cutts, Ford and Goodwin (2011), particularly in the wake of the refugee crises in recent years Hernández and Kriesi (2016).

I contend that there are two primary sources of resentment toward refugees that play a key role in the emergence of projected patriotism: economic and security concerns. Political

elites often exploit these concerns, attributing the blame for perceived economic burdens or security risks to refugees. This process not only exacerbates public resentment but can also lead to the development of symbolic or more overtly argumentative anti-refugee expressions, one of which is the rhetoric of projected patriotism Filindra, Kaplan and Buyuker (2021).

One might reasonably ask why these underlying resentments—particularly those tied to economic, cultural and security concerns do not manifest themselves in more direct ways. Specifically, why do citizens, who feel resentful due to the perceived economic burden of refugees, not simply articulate their frustrations in economic terms, but instead exhibit more complex attitudes like projected patriotism? There are psychological and strategic reasons for this divergence in expression.

First, adopting projected patriotism allows proponents to claim a perceived moral superiority over refugees. By accusing refugees of failing to demonstrate patriotism, individuals advocating for projected patriotism implicitly position themselves as more loyal, more deserving, and more patriotic than the refugees they criticize. This moral high ground is especially compelling since it contrasts those who "do the right thing" (i.e., show national loyalty) with those who are perceived as lacking this quality, even though the latter group is often displaced by forces beyond their control. In this way, projected patriotism offers its proponents a way of asserting their own value and entitlement to national resources. This rhetorical tool allows them to justify their resentment by shifting the blame away from broader socio-political dynamics (such as economic or security policies) and onto the alleged failure of refugees to meet the same patriotic standards.

Second, debates surrounding refugees' economic impact or potential security risks tend

to be inconclusive. The question of whether refugees are a net economic burden or a boon for the host country remains heavily contested. On one side, opponents argue that refugees exacerbate economic strain, especially in terms of social welfare programs, housing, and employment. On the other hand, pro-refugee advocates counter these arguments with evidence suggesting that refugees contribute positively to the economy over time, particularly in terms of labor force participation and entrepreneurial activities. In such a context, focusing on economic or security-related grievances can lead to deadlock, as both sides might find empirical support for their views.

However, when refugees are criticized for lacking patriotism, the discussion shifts from an economic or security-based argument to a moral one. This moral argument is harder to counter, as it goes beyond empirical evidence and touches on shared values of loyalty and national duty. Criticizing refugees for their alleged lack of patriotism implicitly challenges the very core of national identity and raises questions about the loyalty of the host nation's citizens as well. To oppose such a claim would not only seem unpatriotic but also potentially undermine the public's own sense of national pride and loyalty. This makes it a particularly potent tool in shaping political discourse, as questioning patriotism becomes a moral challenge that is difficult to refute without risking public backlash.

$\mathbf{H_{3_0}}$:**Non − Threat**: *Respondents should express similar levels of Projected Patriotism when they are primed with the expectation that migrants will potentially arrive at their country compared to others who are not primed.*

$\mathbf{H_{3_1}}$:**Threat**: *Respondents should express a higher level of Projected Patriotism when*

they are primed with the expectation that migrants will potentially arrive at their country compared to others who are not primed.

It is crucial to examine the specific discourses employed by political elites when discussing the economic implications of immigration, especially in the context of refugee movements. Economic concerns are frequently highlighted in political debates surrounding immigration, and two major theoretical perspectives have been proposed to explain how these concerns shape public attitudes toward migrants.

The first theory is based on labor market competition, which argues that an influx of migrants, depending on their skill levels, increases the overall labor supply, leading to a potential decrease in wages Dustmann and Preston (2007); Malhotra, Margalit and Mo (2013). According to this theory, locals who possess similar skill sets to migrants would be more likely to oppose immigration because they perceive that newcomers will increase competition for jobs, thus lowering wages and making it harder for them to find work. Despite this theoretical framework, a review of the literature on this specific economic concern reveals limited evidence supporting the notion that labor market competition has a substantial negative impact on attitudes toward refugees Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014). However, recent polling data indicates that citizens in European countries still express significant concern about labor competition due to refugees. Interestingly, many respondents rate this concern even higher than security-related fears, underscoring the salience of economic anxiety in the discourse surrounding refugees [3].

The second theory involves a more sociotropic approach, where concerns focus on the

[3]https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-mean-more-terrorism-fewer-jobs/

potential economic burden that refugees might impose on the host country's welfare system and public services. According to the sociotropic model, citizens are primarily concerned with how immigration affects the broader economy and the well-being of the country as a whole, rather than focusing on their own personal economic situation. Studies suggest that citizens in developed countries generally support the immigration of young, skilled migrants because they are perceived as contributors to the economy Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner (2016); Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015). On the other hand, a study conducted in a developing country context found that humanitarian and cultural concerns about refugees often outweigh economic considerations when it comes to shaping public attitudes Alrababa'h et al. (2021). Moreover, a global poll conducted in 2020 revealed that more than half of respondents are skeptical about refugees, questioning whether they are truly fleeing persecution or simply seeking to exploit welfare services **??**.

It is important to note that much of the existing literature on economic concerns and attitudes toward immigration primarily focuses on immigrants in general, rather than specifically on refugees. This distinction could help explain the apparent discrepancy between the scholarship and the public opinion reflected in recent polls. Refugees are fundamentally different from other types of migrants in several significant ways. Unlike economic migrants, who often have the agency to plan their moves and migrate voluntarily, refugees typically flee their home countries under duress due to conflict, war, or natural disasters. As a result, the migration of refugees is often unplanned and occurs in large numbers, which can create a sense of overwhelm within the host society, particularly in terms of resource allocation and social services.

Additionally, refugees are more likely to be in a financially vulnerable position due to the fact that their wealth and property may have been destroyed or lost as a result of displacement. This financial instability, coupled with the sheer scale of refugee movements, can amplify concerns about refugees being a burden on the welfare system. From the perspective of the host population, refugees may be perceived as needing more immediate and extensive support compared to other types of migrants, further intensifying the economic anxiety.

While it is possible that some citizens might favor refugee migration due to their perceived high human capital or skills — particularly those who are educated or have professional backgrounds — this view may not always hold true in the case of refugees. Many refugees, due to time constraints and the urgent nature of their immigration, are often forced to accept low-skilled jobs, regardless of their qualifications, in order to quickly integrate into the labor market. This is often compounded by language barriers and the immediate need for income. Consequently, even if refugees possess significant skills, the lack of integration support or the urgency of their displacement may push them into lower-paying and lower-skill jobs that do not align with the expectations of the host society, thereby undermining the economic rationale for their migration.

This dynamic is particularly salient when considering the impact on low-skilled laborers in the host country. Citizens who are themselves employed in low-skilled jobs are likely to feel the pressure of job competition more acutely, as they have more to lose in terms of job security and wages. These individuals tend to represent a significant portion of the population in most countries, which suggests that economic concerns about job competition are likely to be heightened in the case of refugees compared to other types of migrants. Thus,

the perceived economic burden posed by refugees may be more pronounced in societies with a large base of low-skilled workers, as they are the ones most directly affected by the influx of refugees into the labor market.

H_4: *Respondents should express a higher level of Projected Patriotism if they are primed with mentions of the economic burden that potential migrants could cause.*

Another critical concern often associated with immigration, particularly refugees, is security. To understand how political elites leverage security-related sentiments to further their agendas, it is essential to classify security concerns into two primary categories. The first category is personal security, which primarily involves crimes that are not necessarily politically motivated but are linked to broader social dynamics. In examining how immigration might influence crime rates, several theories have been proposed that attempt to explain the mechanisms through which an influx of migrants, including refugees, could potentially increase criminal activity.

One of the leading theories in this regard is social disorganization theory, which posits that immigration leads to a more ethnically and culturally diverse society. This increased diversity, according to the theory, results in higher levels of residential instability and population heterogeneity. The theory suggests that with increased instability and heterogeneity, it becomes more challenging for communities to establish strong social ties and shared values. As a result, the ability to maintain informal social control over criminal behavior weakens, thereby fostering conditions that may contribute to higher crime rates Ousey and Kubrin (2009); Stowell et al. (2009). In other words, the social fabric of a community may become strained as new immigrants, including refugees, integrate into the society, making it more

difficult to maintain effective social control and reduce criminal behavior.

Another mechanism through which immigration may influence crime rates stems from the economic deprivation experienced by locals as a result of increased job competition and lower wages. According to this perspective, the influx of immigrants, particularly refugees who may have lower skill levels and fewer resources, could exacerbate economic challenges for the host population. This economic strain can, in turn, reduce the opportunity cost of committing crimes. When individuals face economic hardship and limited access to legitimate employment opportunities, they may resort to criminal activities as a means of survival. Additionally, the economic tension between local populations and immigrants can foster intergroup conflict, which can further motivate criminal behavior Butcher and Piehl (1998); Waldinger (1997). As tensions rise, this conflict can escalate into social unrest, potentially leading to increased criminal activity.

Finally, immigrants, particularly those with lower socioeconomic status, may turn to illegal activities such as drug trafficking or other illicit trade for financial survival. This is particularly true for refugees who, due to their precarious position, often face financial instability and lack immediate access to resources. As a result, refugees may be more susceptible to engaging in illegal activities, which can contribute to heightened security concerns in the host country Ousey and Kubrin (2009). These security issues can be viewed as a byproduct of the economic pressures and social marginalization faced by refugees.

Although many academic studies examining the relationship between immigration and crime have produced null or non-significant results, public opinion often contradicts these findings. In Europe, for instance, a substantial portion of the population supports the

belief that "refugees in our country are more to blame for crime than other groups" [4]. This disconnect between scholarly research and public opinion underscores the influence of political discourses on shaping perceptions of refugees and crime.

Given the political context, it is plausible that political elites may intentionally capitalize on public concerns about crime by framing refugees as a source of security threats. By drawing attention to the alleged criminal behavior of refugees, political elites can heighten public anxiety, fostering a climate in which projected patriotism thrives. Projected patriotism, in this context, can be viewed as a moral framework through which citizens rationalize their resentment toward refugees, projecting onto them an idealized version of national loyalty and duty that aligns with the political discourse. This moral projection allows individuals to position themselves as more deserving of national resources and protection, even in the face of economic and social instability.

Thus, I hypothesize that political elites' utilization of security-related concerns, particularly around crime and the alleged role of refugees in exacerbating public insecurity, can contribute to the rise of projected patriotism among the host population. As these concerns are amplified through political rhetoric, individuals may increasingly adopt a stance of projected patriotism, using the alleged security threat posed by refugees as a justification for their attitudes and behaviors toward displaced individuals. This in turn strengthens the division between "us" and "them," further entrenching feelings of loyalty to the nation while simultaneously distancing themselves from those perceived as outsiders or threats.

H_5: *Individuals should express a higher level of Projected Patriotism if they are primed*

[4]https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-mean-more-terrorism-fewer-jobs/

with security concerns that potential refugees could cause.

Lastly, potential cultural differences between the host population and immigrants are often perceived as a threat to the former's cultural identity, a concept that is often referred to as symbolic or cultural threat. These threats are typically understood within a sociopsychological framework, which emphasizes perceptions of sociotropic impacts—that is, the perceived impact on the host country as a whole—rather than individual or egocentric concerns. Symbolic or cultural threats, particularly those related to immigration, are often perceived more seriously and have a more substantial effect on attitudes than economic concerns, such as job competition or resource allocation (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). This underscores the fact that, in many instances, it is not merely the immediate economic consequences of immigration that shape public opinion, but rather deeper fears about the erosion of national culture and values.

The notion of symbolic threat emphasizes how individuals' concerns about cultural differences—such as language, customs, and traditions—can be a powerful driver of anti-immigrant sentiment. Interestingly, self-interest does not always take precedence when it comes to perceptions of cultural threat or the sociotropic economic impacts of immigration (McLaren and Johnson, 2007). That is, even when individuals' economic position is not directly affected, they may still view the presence of immigrants as a cultural encroachment on their way of life. This suggests that the psychological impacts of perceived cultural shifts can be more influential in shaping public attitudes than the tangible economic consequences.

Cultural homogeneity within a society has been shown to correlate strongly with negative attitudes toward immigrants, as demonstrated by research using data from the European

Social Survey (ESS) across 20 European countries (Sides and Citrin, 2007). A study by Card, Dustmann and Preston (2012) further corroborates this argument, showing that concerns about cultural composition and the potential impact on the host country's social fabric are far more significant in shaping attitudes toward immigration than economic concerns like wages and taxes. These findings emphasize that it is not only the potential economic strain immigrants may cause that drives resentment, but also the perceived threat to cultural norms, values, and societal cohesion.

Moreover, research has further disaggregated cultural concerns into specific factors such as the language skills, education levels, and racial or ethnic backgrounds of immigrants. For example, education, particularly at the college level, is seen as an important alleviating factor when it comes to cultural threat, as it correlates with higher language proficiency and better social integration. In the context of the United States, studies have shown that individuals with college education or proficiency in English are viewed more favorably by native-born citizens, particularly in their attitudes toward both legal and illegal immigrants (Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993; Chandler and Tsai, 2001). This is because language proficiency and education are considered indicators of cultural compatibility and social integration, which in turn reduce perceived threats to the host society's cultural identity.

Similarly, in the Netherlands, the inability to speak Dutch is often viewed as a culturally threatening characteristic, signaling an immigrant's potential difficulty in assimilating into the social fabric of the country (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004). This underscores the idea that language and education are not only practical skills but also symbolic markers of cultural belonging. Additionally, race, ethnicity, and country of origin are often key factors

in determining the perceived cultural proximity between immigrants and the host society. Individuals may be more likely to view immigrants from similar racial or ethnic backgrounds as less of a cultural threat, believing that they belong to the same ingroup or share cultural similarities.

In the United Kingdom, studies have shown that white immigrants are generally preferred over non-white immigrants, particularly when the latter are low-skilled (Ford, 2011; Ford, Morrell and Heath, 2012). This preference is also reflected in attitudes toward citizenship: in Switzerland, for instance, voters exhibited much more hesitancy toward granting citizenship to immigrants from Yugoslavia and Turkey than to those from other European countries. This preference for certain immigrant groups based on race or ethnicity highlights the role that perceived cultural affinity plays in shaping public opinion about immigration.

In a developing context, attitudes toward Syrian refugees in Jordan have been shown to be driven more by cultural proximity between the refugees and the host population than by concerns about the economic impact of refugees or other egocentric concerns (Alrababa'h et al., 2021). This finding reinforces the notion that cultural compatibility, rather than economic factors, is often the central concern in shaping attitudes toward immigrants, especially in regions where cultural homogeneity is highly valued.

Taken together, the evidence suggesting that immigrants, and particularly refugees, can be perceived as a cultural threat to host societies is substantial. This perception of cultural threat is frequently harnessed by political elites for electoral purposes, as they use it to rally public support by framing immigration as a danger to national identity and cohesion. I argue that when political elites emphasize the cultural threat posed by immigrants, individuals are

more likely to adopt a stance of Projected Patriotism. In this context, projected patriotism allows individuals to distance themselves from perceived outsiders by emphasizing the superiority of their own cultural values and national identity.

H_6: *Individuals should express a higher level of Projected Patriotism if they are primed with mentions of cultural threat that potential migrants could cause.*

4 Research Design

I conduct survey experiments in Turkey and the United States. The experiments aim to determine how Projected Patriotism is formed, including the effect of immigrant anticipation on it, and to measure how Projected Patriotism affects attitudes towards forcibly displaced people in Turkey context and migrants in the US. The selection of these two countries is motivated by their pronounced differences in both the scale of refugee admissions, as both being hubs for refugees, and their respective levels of socioeconomic development—two factors that frequently underpin broader generalizations about how refugees and migrants are perceived across the developed and developing contexts (Alrababa'h et al., 2021).

In the first experiment, I investigate the determinants of Projected Patriotism and examine how it correlates with other forms of patriotism. In addition to standard demographic questions (e.g., age, ethnicity, religion, education, income), respondents were asked a battery of items designed to assess their identification with national symbols as well as their levels of blind and constructive patriotism. These include items that have been vastly used in previous literature (Butz, 2009; Schatz, Staub and Lavine, 1999; Schatz and Lavine, 2007).

Blind Patriotism Measure: Please state how much do you agree or disagree with each

of the statements. (1: Strongly disagree, 5: Strongly agree)

- People who do not wholeheartedly support America should live somewhere else.
- It is un-American to criticize this country.
- I would support my country right or wrong.
- The United States is virtually always right.
- I support U.S. constitution, for the very reason that it is the constitution of my country.

Constructive Patriotism Measure: Please state how much do you agree or disagree with each of the statements. (1: Strongly disagree, 5: Strongly agree)

- We should have complete freedom of speech even for those who criticize this country.
- Criticizing the United States does not make one less American.
- If you love America, you should notice its problems and work to correct them.
- If I criticize the United States, I do so out of love for my country.
- I oppose some constitutional amendments because I care about my country and want to improve it. society.

National Symbols Measure: Please state how much do you agree or disagree with each of the statements. (1: Strongly disagree, 5: Strongly agree)

- National anthem should be played at sports events.
- Everyone in this country should celebrate Independence Day with joy.
- There should be legal repercussions for those who disrespect our national flag.

- Pledge of allegiance should be recited by students

  society.

Following this, participants were randomly assigned to one of five vignette conditions. The control group received a general description of refugees without any specific framing.

"As of the end of June 2024, there are an estimated 122.6 million people worldwide who have been forced to flee their homes. Among them, approximately 43.7 million are refugees. More than 1 in every 67 people in the world have been forced to flee.

Among those were 43.7 million refugees. There were also 72.1 million internally displaced people and 8 million asylum seekers."

The first treatment condition added a reference to one of the refugees' potential settlement countries—Turkey for the U.S. sample, and the United States for the Turkish sample. The contrast between the control and this condition is intended to shed light on whether respondents' expressions of Projected Patriotism are primarily driven by abstract threat perceptions or by more targeted feelings of resentment.

"As of the end of June 2024, there are an estimated 122.6 million people worldwide who have been forced to flee their homes. Among them, approximately 43.7 million are refugees. More than 1 in every 67 people in the world have been forced to flee.

According to research, the number of forcibly displaced people is expected to increase.

United States remains a potential hub for refugees."

The remaining three treatments introduced frames emphasizing economic, security, or cultural concerns related to refugee inflows. These were designed to capture the potential influence of elite discourse in activating Projected Patriotism.

"As of the end of June 2024, there are an estimated 122.6 million people worldwide who have been forced to flee their homes. Among them, approximately 43.7 million are refugees. More than 1 in every 67 people in the world have been forced to flee.

One of the consequences of displacement that has been emphasized is its effect on the economy/security/culture in the host country.

Some politicians point to the fact that migration to the United States may cause an increase in unemployment and a burden on welfare system/cause an increase in crimes and violence/pose a threat to the culture, including loss of English as the main language in daily life."

Projected Patriotism Measure: Please state how much do you agree or disagree with each of the statements. (1: Strongly disagree, 5: Strongly agree)

- People who are not Americans should feel loyal to their own country.
- Citizens of other countries should serve their country in any way they can, independent of what their country is.
- I value the importance of non-Americans prioritizing their own country.
- Defending one's country is a noble patriotic duty, and individuals should defend their own country, even if it is against my country.

- No matter what those policies are, people of other countries should support their own national policy. society.

5 Results

5.1 Measurement and Validation of Projected Patriotism

To determine whether the five survey items reliably measure a single underlying factor representing Projected Patriotism, I performed several psychometric validation procedures. These included Exploratory Graph Analysis (EGA), Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), and tests for convergent and discriminant validity. Each method provides complementary evidence regarding the scale's internal coherence and its distinction from related constructs.

I first applied Exploratory Graph Analysis, a network-based technique that uncovers the dimensional structure of a scale by identifying clusters within a network of partial correlations among items. EGA is gaining popularity in political and psychological research for its advantages over traditional factor analytic methods, especially when dealing with a small number of items and without relying on strict linear assumptions (Golino and Epskamp, 2017; Christensen, Golino and Silvia, 2020). In both the Turkish and U.S. samples, EGA consistently identified a unidimensional structure, replicating this pattern 100

To formally confirm this one-factor solution, I ran separate confirmatory factor analyses for each country. The model fit indices show that a unidimensional model fits well. In Turkey, fit statistics were RMSEA = 0.065, SRMR = 0.025, CFI = 0.976, and TLI = 0.952, reflecting good fit. For the U.S. sample, fit was somewhat lower but still acceptable for short attitude scales (RMSEA = 0.087, SRMR = 0.043, CFI = 0.945, TLI = 0.891). Factor

loadings ranged from moderate to strong, between 0.53 and 0.69 in both samples, indicating that each item meaningfully contributes to measuring Projected Patriotism.

The single factor accounted for a meaningful proportion of the variance in item responses: 45.5% in Turkey (SS = 2.277) and 38.3% in the U.S. (SS = 1.92). These values are consistent with typical findings for psychological constructs involving complex social attitudes measured with few items.

5.2 Determinants and Experimental Results

First, I test the hypothesis that Projected Patriotism is more strongly correlated with Blind Patriotism than with Constructive Patriotism. A simple correlation analysis reveals that, in the United States, the correlation between average scores of Projected Patriotism and Blind Patriotism is 0.35, while the correlation with Constructive Patriotism is 0.19. In Turkey, the corresponding correlations are 0.33 and 0.32, respectively. These results support the hypothesis, especially in the U.S. context, where Projected Patriotism is more closely aligned with Blind Patriotism.

More importantly, however, the magnitude of the correlations in both contexts remains moderate at best. This suggests that although Projected Patriotism shares elements with established forms of patriotism commonly analyzed in the literature, it also captures distinct attitudinal dimensions not fully encompassed by either subtype. As such, these findings lend support to the notion that Projected Patriotism may represent a relatively unique form of national attachment. Correlation plots are provided in the Appendix.

Overall, these analyses support the construct validity of Projected Patriotism. Evidence

Table 1: Correlation matrix of Patriotism measures - United States

	Blind P.	Constructive P.	Projected P.
Blind Patriotism	1.00	-0.12	0.35
Constructive Patriotism	-0.12	1.00	0.19
Projected Patriotism	0.35	0.19	1.00

Table 2: Correlation matrix of Patriotism measures - Turkey

	Blind P.	Constructive P.	Projected P.
Blind Patriotism	1.00	0.01	0.33
Constructive Patriotism	0.01	1.00	0.32
Projected Patriotism	0.33	0.32	1.00

from both Turkey and the United States suggests the scale is unidimensional, internally reliable, and sufficiently distinct from blind and constructive patriotism. These psychometric properties justify its application in investigating how Projected Patriotism influences public attitudes toward migrants in different national settings.

Second, I present results from difference-in-means analyses conducted separately for each country to assess the impact of elite rhetoric on Projected Patriotism. Specifically, the experimental treatments focused on three commonly used rhetorical frames concerning refugees in addition to general threat: their perceived impact on the economy, national security, and cultural identity. To ensure the validity of the analysis, respondents who were non-citizens, as well as those who failed attention or manipulation checks, were excluded from the sample.

Table 3: The effect of each treatment compared to placebo condition and unadjusted p-values for the United States. Combined treatment refers to the grouping of all treatments against placebo.

Treatment	Effect Size	P-value
Culture	0.28	0.01
Economy	0.35	0.00
General	0.13	0.23
Security	0.11	0.31
Combined treatment	0.22	0.01

Table 4: The effect of each treatment compared to placebo condition and unadjusted p-values for the United States. Combined treatment refers to the grouping of all treatments against placebo.

Treatment	Effect Size	P-value
Culture	0.18	0.10
Economy	0.22	0.02
General	0.14	0.12
Security	0.22	0.02
Combined_threat	0.19	0.01

Tables **??** present the results of the experimental treatments designed to prime different types of perceived threats associated with refugees—namely, general, economic, security-related, and cultural threats. As hypothesized, exposure to elite rhetoric emphasizing these threat frames generally increases respondents' endorsement of Projected Patriotism. However, the magnitude and statistical significance of these effects vary across treatment types and national contexts.

In the United States, rhetoric emphasizing cultural and economic threats appears to be most effective in increasing levels of Projected Patriotism. In contrast, in the Turkish context, it is the economic and security threat frames that show stronger effects. The general threat frame, which did not focus on any specific domain, consistently underperforms in both countries. One plausible explanation is that the general threat message lacks the specificity needed to trigger a strong affective or cognitive reaction. In contrast, specific threats—particularly those linked to cultural or economic stability—may resonate more directly with respondents' concerns and thereby elicit stronger responses.

The comparatively weaker effect of the security threat frame in the United States may be attributable to differences in refugee vetting processes. Unlike many countries in the Global South—including Turkey—where refugees may arrive through less formal or more immediate

pathways, refugees entering the United States typically undergo an extensive vetting process. This process is heavily focused on background checks and national security screening. As such, for some respondents, the perceived security threat posed by refugees may be less credible or salient than concerns about economic competition or cultural change.

It is also worth noting that the image of a "refugee" in the minds of American respondents may not align neatly with official definitions. For instance, migrants from Central America—who may be fleeing violence or persecution—are sometimes viewed not as refugees, but as economic migrants. This blurring of categories complicates interpretations of how respondents react to security-based frames, as their mental image of a refugee may not align with the population the rhetoric is intended to target.

Given these contextual nuances, the interpretations offered here are not conclusive. Further research would help us better understand how individuals in different countries conceptualize the category of "refugee" and how these mental representations shape their responses to elite rhetoric. In particular, they could explore the extent to which variation in perceived refugee archetypes moderates the effectiveness of different rhetorical frames.

Lastly, I estimate a multivariate regression model to test the hypothesis that individuals who feel a stronger attachment to national symbols, are more likely to express Projected Patriotism.

Table 5: Multivariate OLS results testing the relationship between attachment to national symbols and having served in military, and Projected Patriotism.

Term	Estimate	P-Value
National Symbols	0.11	0.01

When examining the role of national symbols, the results presented in Table **??** indicate

Table 6: Multivariate OLS results testing the relationship between attachment to national symbols and having family served in military, and Projected Patriotism.

Term	Estimate	P-value
National Symbols	0.10	0.15

that individuals who report a stronger attachment to national symbols tend to express higher levels of Projected Patriotism in the United States. This relationship is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. In the Turkish sample, the association is in the same direction but does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance ($p = 0.15$).

At first glance, this might suggest that the link between attachment to national symbols and Projected Patriotism is weaker in the Turkish context. However, this interpretation must be qualified by considering the distribution of the national symbols measure. In Turkey, the average score for attachment to national symbols is 4.301 (on a 5-point scale), with a median of 4.75. By comparison, the U.S. average is notably lower at 3.297, with a median of 3.25. The Turkish distribution is thus highly skewed toward the upper end of the scale, indicating widespread and intense attachment to national symbols across the sample. This skewness, and the resulting lack of variation, likely constrains the ability to detect a statistically significant relationship with Projected Patriotism, even if one exists Wooldridge (2016). In contrast, the greater variation in the U.S. data allows for a clearer estimation of the relationship between symbolic attachment and patriotic projection.

6 Conclusion

This paper makes the following contributions to the literature. First, it revisits the literature that focuses on "voluntariness" of migration, and questions the assumption that involuntary migrants -refugees- receive more sympathy than voluntary migrants -labor migrants-

drawing on recent examples of shaming of refugees due to not fighting for their country. To explain this, it introduces a novel concept of Projected Patriotism, a distinct understanding of patriotism that also has patriotic expectations for citizens of other countries, an important aspect that existing definitions have failed to pay attention so far. Second, this paper provides quantitative evidence on its underlying determinants—who is more likely to express it, and the conditions under which it tends to emerge, in both a developed and a developing context, latter of which have continuously received inadequate attention when it comes to attitudes towards refugees.

The analysis begins by situating Projected Patriotism in relation to more established forms of patriotic stances. As anticipated, it correlates more strongly with Blind Patriotism than with Constructive Patriotism, particularly in the United States. This aligns with theoretical expectations, as the less critical and more idealistic orientation of Blind Patriotism may make it more readily generalizable for citizens of other countries — allowing individuals to project this loyalty outward in ways that resonate with Projected Patriotism. However, the relatively modest strength of these correlations in both countries suggests that Projected Patriotism is not reducible to either form. It appears to tap into a distinct dimension of national identification that cannot necessarily be mirrored by existing understandings of patriotism.

Elite rhetoric, in particular, emerged as a key contextual trigger. Across both national contexts, exposure to messages framing refugees in terms of specific threats—economic, cultural, or security-related—tended to elevate levels of Projected Patriotism. However, the type of threat that proved most effective varied by country. In the United States, economic

and cultural threat frames had the strongest effect, while in Turkey, security and economic frames were more influential. These differences are likely rooted in the broader political and institutional contexts in which refugee politics are embedded. In the United States, for instance, the perception of refugees as security threats may be less compelling due to the extensive vetting procedures that precede refugee resettlement. In contrast, in Turkey—where refugee arrivals have been more sudden, visible, and tied to geopolitical instability—the security frame resonates more readily. These findings underscore that Projected Patriotism is not simply an individual disposition, but one that is highly responsive to the political environment and the rhetoric circulating within it.

Symbolic attachment to national emblems and rituals—such as the flag, national anthem, and other markers of national identity—was a more consistent predictor. In the United States, individuals who reported stronger emotional connection to national symbols were significantly more likely to express Projected Patriotism. A similar, though weaker, relationship was observed in Turkey, where average levels of symbolic attachment were already very high. In such a context, the reduced variance in symbolic attachment may suppress observable associations. Nonetheless, the pattern suggests that Projected Patriotism is not only reactive to political cues but also deeply tied to affective and symbolic dimensions of national identity.

Taken together, the findings on the determinants of Projected Patriotism reveal a form of patriotic understanding that is both contextually sensitive and symbolically loaded. It is shaped by how individuals understand and relate to different forms of patriotism, who is seen as threatening it, and how individuals relate to its symbols and institutions. These

insights contribute to a broader understanding of how patriotism is activated and expressed in different political settings, and how it interacts with processes of othering, securitization, and national belonging. As such, Projected Patriotism offers a useful conceptual lens for analyzing public opinion in increasingly polarized and nationalized political landscapes, especially with respect to conflict migrants.

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A Supplemental Information

B Pre-Registration

This study was pre-registered with Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP). The registration including the pre-analysis plan is available here: https://osf.io/s3vrd

C Sample

I carried out a survey experiment with nationally representative samples of adult citizens (aged 18 and older) in the U.S. and Turkey. The study was conducted using Prolific for the United States, and galataanket.com for Turkey. Each experiment aimed to include 1,000 respondents per country. The experiments were conducted in March-April 2024.

I collected data on pre-treatment variables identified as important by my theory and previous literature. Detailed measures of blind patriotism, constructive patriotism, attachment to national symbols and Projected Patriotism can be found in the Survey Texts section of this appendix, and others in the Pre-Analysis Plan. Variables including age, gender, education, ideology, political party/stance, military service, employment, and race/ethnicity have been collected. Ideology was assessed on a categorical basis, including conservative, liberal and neither conservative nor liberal in the US, and left, right and neither in Turkey. Similarly, political party/stance was measured categorically as Republican, Democrat, and Independent in the US, and pro-government, pro-opposition and neither in Turkey.

Blind patriotism, constructive patriotism, attachment to national symbols and Projected Patriotism were measured using multiple-item indices, with each question response on a 1-5 scale. For each index, an index was created as the mean across the questionnaire, resulting

in a final outcome on a 1-5 scale.

D Experimental Design

I conduct survey experiments in Turkey and the United States to analyze determinants of Projected Patirotism. In Turkey, the focus is on Ukrainian refugees fleeing the Russian invasion, while in the United States, the focus is on Central American migrants escaping gang violence. These cases provide valuable insights into how Projected Patriotism is formed and how it influences perceptions of forcibly displaced people. Turkey's significant refugee population and its proximity to Ukraine make it an ideal case to test the impact of refugee anticipation. Meanwhile, adding the United States allows for variation in the type of conflict driving displacement, enabling a broader understanding of Projected Patriotism's effects across different contexts.

The experiments examine the determinants of Projected Patriotism and its relationship with other patriotism types. Alongside demographic questions, respondents are asked about their and their families' military service, attachment to national symbols, blind patriotism, and constructive patriotism. Respondents are then presented with five vignettes: a control scenario describing refugees or migrants settling in neighboring countries, and four treatments mentioning Turkey (or the US), economic, security, or cultural concerns. These treatments assess whether Projected Patriotism stems from resentment or threat, particularly when amplified by political discourse. For conscription, I compare Turkish and American respondents, as well as Turkish males who either served extended military terms or opted for a shorter paid alternative.

The treatment effect for elite rhetoric, focusing on the refugee-related issues, is determined using a difference-in-means analysis, which compares the responses of participants exposed to different rhetorical treatments with placebo. The effects of national symbols, military service, and the two patriotism subtypes (blind and constructive patriotism) on Projected Patriotism are estimated using a multivariate regression model, which takes the following form:

$$\text{Projected Patriotism} = \alpha + \beta_1 Rhetoric + \beta_2 Blind + \beta_3 Constructive + \beta_4 NationalSymbol + \beta_5 controlvariables + \epsilon$$

E Descriptive Statistics

Table 7: Descriptive Statistics - Categorical Variables (US)

Variable	**Proportion**
Gender	
Female	0.50
Male	0.48
Neither	0.01
Ideology	
Liberal	0.44
Conservative	0.37
Neither	0.19
Partisanship	
Democrat Party	0.39
Republican Party	0.37
Independent	0.24
Employment	
Part-time	0.20
Full-time	0.57
Unemployed (not seeking)	0.05
Unemployed (seeking)	0.08
Retired	0.10
Race	
African-American	0.12
Asian	0.07
Hispanic	0.08
White	0.64
Others	0.09

Table 8: Descriptive Statistics - Numerical Variables (US)

Variable	Min.	1st Quarter	Median	Mean	3rd Quarter	Max.
Age	18	31	46	45.11	58	87
Education	4	14	16	16.04	18	28
Blind Patriotism	1	1.8	2.6	2.668	3.4	5
Constructive Patriotism	1	3.6	4.2	4.003	4.4	5
National Symbols	1	2.5	3.25	3.297	4.25	5
Projected Patriotism	1	2.6	3.2	3.195	3.8	5

Table 9: Descriptive Statistics - Categorical variables (Turkey)

Variable	**Proportion**
Gender	
Female	0.54
Male	0.46
Ideology	
Left	0.25
Right	0.25
Neither	0.50
Partisanship	
Government	0.24
Opposition	0.35
Neither	0.41
Employment	
Part-time	0.04
Full-time	0.61
Unemployed (not seeking)	0.07
Unemployed (seeking)	0.14
Retired	0.14
Race	
Turkish	0.85
Kurdish	0.11
Arab	0.006
Others	0.04

Table 10: Descriptive Statistics - Numerical Variables (US)

Variable	Min.	1st Quarter	Median	Mean	3rd Quarter	Max.
Age	18	31	46	45.11	58	87
Education	4	14	16	16.04	18	28
Blind Patriotism	1	1.8	2.6	2.668	3.4	5
Constructive Patriotism	1	3.6	4.2	4.003	4.4	5
National Symbols	1	2.5	3.25	3.297	4.25	5
Projected Patriotism	1	2.6	3.2	3.195	3.8	5

Figure 1: Correlation plot - United States



Figure 2: Correlation plot - Turkey



Figure 3: Distribution plots of Blind Patriotism - United States



Figure 4: Distribution plots of Blind Patriotism - Turkey



Figure 5: Distribution plots of Constructive Patriotism - United States



Figure 6: Distribution plots of Constructive Patriotism - Turkey



Figure 7: Distribution plots of National Symbols - United States



Figure 8: Distribution plots of National Symbols - Turkey



Figure 9: Distribution plots of Projected Patriotism - United States



Figure 10: Distribution plots of Projected Patriotism - Turkey



F Regression Tables and Robustness Checks

Table 11: The effect of each treatment compared to placebo condition and unadjusted p-values for United States, excluding speeders (cutoff: .2).

Treatment	Effect Size	P-value
Culture	0.31	0.01
Economy	0.38	0.00
General	0.14	0.25
Security	0.17	0.18

Table 12: The effect of each treatment compared to placebo condition and unadjusted p-values for United States, excluding speeders (cutoff: .25).

Treatment	Effect Size	P-value
Culture	0.32	0.01
Economy	0.38	0.00
General	0.15	0.24
Security	0.21	0.12

Table 13: The effect of each treatment compared to placebo condition and unadjusted p-values for United States, excluding speeders (cutoff: .3).

Treatment	Effect Size	P-value
Culture	0.36	0.00
Economy	0.37	0.00
General	0.15	0.26
Security	0.27	0.05

Table 14: The effect of each treatment compared to placebo condition and unadjusted p-values for Turkey, excluding speeders (cutoff: .2).

Treatment	Effect Size	P-value
Culture	0.16	0.18
Economy	0.24	0.02
General	0.19	0.07
Security	0.23	0.04

Table 15: The effect of each treatment compared to placebo condition and unadjusted p-values for Turkey, excluding speeders (cutoff: .25).

Treatment	Effect Size	P-value
Culture	0.12	0.31
Economy	0.19	0.09
General	0.13	0.24
Security	0.18	0.09

Table 16: The effect of each treatment compared to placebo condition and unadjusted p-values for United States, excluding speeders (cutoff: .3).

Treatment	Effect Size	P-value
Culture	0.11	0.26
Economy	0.17	0.13
General	0.16	0.15
Security	0.16	0.17

Table 17: Main model - United States

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	1.0692	0.2784	3.84	0.0001
Constructive Patriotism	0.2583	0.0482	5.36	0.0000
National Symbols	0.1093	0.0431	2.54	0.0115
Blind Patriotism	0.1808	0.0527	3.43	0.0007
Male	0.0658	0.0642	1.02	0.3058
Neither male nor female	-0.2220	0.2981	-0.74	0.4567
Military service	0.1353	0.1389	0.97	0.3306
Asian	-0.3404	0.1480	-2.30	0.0218
Hispanic/Latino	-0.2246	0.1395	-1.61	0.1079
Native American	0.0074	0.2183	0.03	0.9729
Other race	0.0070	0.7278	0.01	0.9923
Two or more races	-0.2399	0.1551	-1.55	0.1225
White/Caucausian	-0.2444	0.0969	-2.52	0.0120
Liberal	0.0336	0.1065	0.32	0.7523
Neither Conservative nor Liberal	0.0969	0.1245	0.78	0.4372
Independent	-0.0655	0.1017	-0.64	0.5198
Republican Party	0.2017	0.1081	1.87	0.0626
Unemployed and seeking jobs	0.3505	0.1711	2.05	0.0411
Employed full-time/Self-employed	0.2097	0.1395	1.50	0.1334
Employed part-time	0.1858	0.1495	1.24	0.2144
Retired	-0.0851	0.1656	-0.51	0.6074
Threat (general)	0.1394	0.0966	1.44	0.1497
Threat (culture)	0.2766	0.0988	2.80	0.0053
Threat (economy)	0.3310	0.0958	3.46	0.0006
Threat (security)	0.0632	0.0949	0.67	0.5056

Table 18: Main model - Turkey

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	2.1809	0.7705	2.83	0.0051
Constructive Patriotism	0.1296	0.0655	1.98	0.0493
National Symbols	0.0952	0.0652	1.46	0.1460
Blind Patriotism	0.2592	0.0588	4.41	0.0000
Military Service	0.0608	0.1581	0.38	0.7009
Circassian	0.1115	0.9965	0.11	0.9111
Other ethnicity	0.2690	0.8555	0.31	0.7536
Kurdish	-0.0704	0.7030	-0.10	0.9203
Turkish	-0.0078	0.6913	-0.01	0.9910
Right wing	-0.1958	0.1506	-1.30	0.1953
Left wing	-0.2167	0.1590	-1.36	0.1746
Pro-government	-0.0407	0.1560	-0.26	0.7944
Opposition	0.1405	0.1412	1.00	0.3208
Unemployed but not seeking jobs	-0.6749	0.3040	-2.22	0.0276
Unemployed and seeking jobs	0.0180	0.1891	0.09	0.9244
Employed full time/Self-employed	-0.0317	0.1232	-0.26	0.7972
Employed part-time	-0.2312	0.2076	-1.11	0.2667
Threat (general)	0.1454	0.1451	1.00	0.3174
Threat (culture)	-0.0211	0.1621	-0.13	0.8965
Threat (economy)	0.1511	0.1403	1.08	0.2828
Threat (security)	0.3100	0.1501	2.06	0.0403

Table 19: Model with alternative military service measure (family) - United States

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	1.0836	0.2819	3.84	0.0001
Constructive Patriotism	0.2575	0.0486	5.29	0.0000
National Symbols	0.1129	0.0434	2.60	0.0096
Blind Patriotism	0.1766	0.0531	3.32	0.0010
Male	0.0761	0.0638	1.19	0.2334
Neither	-0.2592	0.2949	-0.88	0.3799
Family_military	-0.0285	0.0666	-0.43	0.6683
Asian	-0.3347	0.1485	-2.25	0.0247
Hispanic/Latino	-0.2207	0.1412	-1.56	0.1186
Native American	0.0294	0.2186	0.13	0.8931
Other race	0.0069	0.7299	0.01	0.9925
Race Prefer not to say	0.0351	0.4723	0.07	0.9408
Two or more races	-0.2180	0.1588	-1.37	0.1703
White/Caucausian	-0.2417	0.0978	-2.47	0.0137
Liberal	0.0362	0.1071	0.34	0.7354
Neither Conservative nor Liberal	0.0913	0.1260	0.72	0.4690
Independent	-0.0550	0.1027	-0.54	0.5926
Republican Party	0.1995	0.1088	1.83	0.0672
Unemployed and seeking opportunities	0.3502	0.1724	2.03	0.0427
Employed full-time/Self-employed	0.2022	0.1398	1.45	0.1489
Employed part-time	0.1787	0.1503	1.19	0.2348
Retired	-0.0766	0.1669	-0.46	0.6464
Threat (general)	0.1460	0.0972	1.50	0.1336
Threat (culture)	0.2937	0.1000	2.94	0.0035
Threat (economy)	0.3203	0.0967	3.31	0.0010
Threat (security)	0.0658	0.0955	0.69	0.4912

Table 20: Model excluding speeders (cutoff: .2) - United States

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	1.0836	0.2819	3.84	0.0001
Constructive Patriotism	0.2575	0.0486	5.29	0.0000
National Symbols	0.1129	0.0434	2.60	0.0096
Blind Patriotism	0.1766	0.0531	3.32	0.0010
Male	0.0761	0.0638	1.19	0.2334
Neither male nor female	-0.2592	0.2949	-0.88	0.3799
Military Service (family)	-0.0285	0.0666	-0.43	0.6683
Asian	-0.3347	0.1485	-2.25	0.0247
Hispanic/Latino	-0.2207	0.1412	-1.56	0.1186
Native American	0.0294	0.2186	0.13	0.8931
Other race	0.0069	0.7299	0.01	0.9925
Two or more races	-0.2180	0.1588	-1.37	0.1703
White/Caucausian	-0.2417	0.0978	-2.47	0.0137
Liberal	0.0362	0.1071	0.34	0.7354
Neither Conservative nor Liberal	0.0913	0.1260	0.72	0.4690
Independent	-0.0550	0.1027	-0.54	0.5926
Republican Party	0.1995	0.1088	1.83	0.0672
Unemployed and seeking jobs	0.3502	0.1724	2.03	0.0427
Employed full-time/Self-employed	0.2022	0.1398	1.45	0.1489
Employed part-time	0.1787	0.1503	1.19	0.2348
Retired	-0.0766	0.1669	-0.46	0.6464
Threat (general)	0.1460	0.0972	1.50	0.1336
Threat (culture)	0.2937	0.1000	2.94	0.0035
Threat (economy)	0.3203	0.0967	3.31	0.0010
Threat (security)	0.0658	0.0955	0.69	0.4912

Table 21: Model excluding speeders (cutoff: .25) - United States

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	1.0836	0.2819	3.84	0.0001
Constructive Patriotism	0.2575	0.0486	5.29	0.0000
National Symbols	0.1129	0.0434	2.60	0.0096
Blind Patriotism	0.1766	0.0531	3.32	0.0010
Male	0.0761	0.0638	1.19	0.2334
Neither male nor female	-0.2592	0.2949	-0.88	0.3799
Military service (family)	-0.0285	0.0666	-0.43	0.6683
Asian	-0.3347	0.1485	-2.25	0.0247
Hispanic/Latino	-0.2207	0.1412	-1.56	0.1186
Native American	0.0294	0.2186	0.13	0.8931
Other race	0.0069	0.7299	0.01	0.9925
Two or more races	-0.2180	0.1588	-1.37	0.1703
White/Caucausian	-0.2417	0.0978	-2.47	0.0137
Liberal	0.0362	0.1071	0.34	0.7354
Neither Conservative nor Liberal	0.0913	0.1260	0.72	0.4690
Independent	-0.0550	0.1027	-0.54	0.5926
Republican Party	0.1995	0.1088	1.83	0.0672
Unemployed and seeking jobs	0.3502	0.1724	2.03	0.0427
Employed full-time/Self-employed	0.2022	0.1398	1.45	0.1489
Employed part-time	0.1787	0.1503	1.19	0.2348
Retired	-0.0766	0.1669	-0.46	0.6464
Threat (general)	0.1460	0.0972	1.50	0.1336
Threat (culture)	0.2937	0.1000	2.94	0.0035
Threat (economy)	0.3203	0.0967	3.31	0.0010
Threat (security)	0.0658	0.0955	0.69	0.4912

Table 22: Model excluding speeders (cutoff: .3) - United States

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	0.9120	0.3362	2.71	0.0070
Constructive Patriotism	0.2843	0.0615	4.62	0.0000
National Symbols	0.1262	0.0519	2.43	0.0155
Blind Patriotism	0.1432	0.0638	2.24	0.0255
Male	0.0959	0.0774	1.24	0.2157
Neither male nor female	-0.5352	0.6009	-0.89	0.3737
Military service	-0.0061	0.1665	-0.04	0.9710
Asian	-0.5531	0.1850	-2.99	0.0030
Hispanic/Latino	-0.2309	0.1599	-1.44	0.1496
Native American	-0.1691	0.3129	-0.54	0.5893
Other race	-0.1541	0.7399	-0.21	0.8351
Two or more races	-0.4575	0.1782	-2.57	0.0107
White/Caucausian	-0.2516	0.1081	-2.33	0.0206
Liberal	0.1008	0.1209	0.83	0.4050
Neither Conservative nor Liberal	0.0537	0.1490	0.36	0.7189
Independent	0.0278	0.1240	0.22	0.8225
Republican Party	0.3224	0.1237	2.61	0.0095
Unemployed and seeking jobs	0.4393	0.2081	2.11	0.0354
Employed full-time/Self-employed	0.1827	0.1690	1.08	0.2805
Employed part-time	0.2324	0.1826	1.27	0.2038
Retired	-0.0960	0.1928	-0.50	0.6190
Threat (general)	0.1744	0.1164	1.50	0.1348
threat (culture)	0.3123	0.1180	2.65	0.0085
Threat (economy)	0.3962	0.1164	3.40	0.0007
Threat (security)	0.1339	0.1160	1.15	0.2490

Table 23: Model excluding speeders (cutoff: .2) - Turkey

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	2.0095	0.8035	2.50	0.0134
Constructive Patriotism	0.1883	0.0717	2.63	0.0095
National Symbols	0.0557	0.0695	0.80	0.4240
Blind Patriotism	0.2741	0.0628	4.37	0.0000
Military Service	0.1633	0.1810	0.90	0.3681
Other ethnicity	0.5873	0.8659	0.68	0.4986
Kurdish	0.0182	0.7010	0.03	0.9793
Turkish	-0.0519	0.6865	-0.08	0.9398
Right wing	-0.2478	0.1621	-1.53	0.1283
Left wing	-0.3682	0.1730	-2.13	0.0349
Pro-government	0.0437	0.1718	0.25	0.7994
Opposition	0.2362	0.1535	1.54	0.1259
Unemployed but not seeking jobs	-0.6389	0.3262	-1.96	0.0520
Unemployed and seeking jobs	0.0266	0.1924	0.14	0.8901
Employed full time/Self-employed	-0.0954	0.1283	-0.74	0.4582
Employed part-time	-0.7479	0.3214	-2.33	0.0212
Threat (general)	0.2010	0.1635	1.23	0.2209
Threat (culture)	0.0360	0.1742	0.21	0.8365
Threat (economy)	0.1342	0.1531	0.88	0.3818
Threat (security)	0.3683	0.1697	2.17	0.0315

Table 24: Model excluding speeders (cutoff: .25) - Turkey

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	2.5728	0.6074	4.24	0.0000
Constructive Patriotism	0.1849	0.0732	2.53	0.0126
National Symbols	0.0551	0.0715	0.77	0.4421
Blind Patriotism	0.2774	0.0667	4.16	0.0001
Military Service	0.1744	0.1896	0.92	0.3591
Kurdish	-0.5512	0.5529	-1.00	0.3205
Turkish	-0.6062	0.5448	-1.11	0.2677
Right wing	-0.2340	0.1714	-1.37	0.1743
Left wing	-0.3118	0.1809	-1.72	0.0868
Pro-government	0.0179	0.1773	0.10	0.9195
Opposition	0.2176	0.1622	1.34	0.1818
Unemployed but not seeking jobs	-0.7998	0.3616	-2.21	0.0285
Unemployed and seeking jobs	0.0484	0.1953	0.25	0.8047
Employed full time/Self-employed	-0.0470	0.1322	-0.36	0.7227
Employed part-time	-0.7121	0.3248	-2.19	0.0299
Threat (general)	0.1681	0.1693	0.99	0.3224
Threat (culture)	-0.0059	0.1775	-0.03	0.9737
Threat (economy)	0.0703	0.1584	0.44	0.6578
Threat (security)	0.3306	0.1772	1.87	0.0641

Table 25: Model excluding speeders (cutoff: .3) - Turkey

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	2.4607	0.6099	4.03	0.0001
Constructive Patriotism	0.1878	0.0733	2.56	0.0115
National Symbols	0.0487	0.0713	0.68	0.4952
Blind Patriotism	0.2992	0.0671	4.46	0.0000
Military Service	0.3146	0.1987	1.58	0.1156
Kurdish	-0.5790	0.5494	-1.05	0.2937
Turkish	-0.6746	0.5416	-1.25	0.2149
Right wing	-0.2284	0.1735	-1.32	0.1903
Left wing	-0.2895	0.1797	-1.61	0.1094
Pro-government	0.0043	0.1815	0.02	0.9813
Opposition	0.2395	0.1618	1.48	0.1411
Unemployed but not seeking jobs	-0.7971	0.3579	-2.23	0.0275
Unemployed and seeking jobs	0.0541	0.1942	0.28	0.7811
Employed full time/Self-employed	-0.0735	0.1323	-0.56	0.5793
Employed part-time	-0.7092	0.3226	-2.20	0.0296
Threat (general)	0.1450	0.1712	0.85	0.3984
Threat (culture)	0.0035	0.1775	0.02	0.9844
Threat (economy)	-0.0035	0.1602	-0.02	0.9824
Threat (security)	0.3277	0.1800	1.82	0.0709