Fleeing (in)voluntarily:
How Projected Patriotism Shapes Attitudes Towards Conflict Migrants

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Abstract

What shapes attitudes towards conflict refugees? A growing literature points out the events that cause displacement, which can be grouped as voluntary (economic migrants) and involuntary (refugees), and the latter has been shown to elicit more positive attitudes than the former. The effect of common conflict types such as civil war, invasion, or gang violence, which does not immediately signal deliberate targeting as in the case of ethnic or religious persecution, is yet to be tested. Further, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary migration is based on assumptions that need to be addressed. While involuntary migration is argued to attract more sympathy than voluntary migration, I argue that fleeing conflict events such as, civil war, invasion or gang violence, which constitute the main driver for the majority of forced displacements is not necessarily perceived as an involuntary act. To explain when and how people perceive it as a voluntary act, I introduce the concept of patriotism called *Projected Patriotism*. People who embrace this notion expect citizens of other countries to act in patriotic ways and judge them accordingly, shaping their attitudes toward refugees. Employing conjoint survey experiments in the United States and Turkey, I test these hypotheses. While conflict refugees are preferred more than economic migrants, the evidence suggests that this preference disappears with individuals with high Projected Patriotism in Turkey. The findings challenge the existing understanding about what constitutes voluntariness of migration and its effects on attitudes.

1 Introduction

Four years ago, a petition called "Syrian male refugees in Turkey who are between the ages of 18 and 45 should be deployed and fight for Syria." was introduced on change.org. The petition had been supported by 290,504 visitors consisting of mainly Turkish citizens, if not completely. It explicitly accuses and shames Syrian refugees of "betraying their country" by not fighting for it. In addition to the utter display of negative attitudes towards refugees in Turkey which is also supported by surveys [1], the petition sheds a light on the elements that shape attitudes towards refugees. It not only requests refugees to leave Turkey but also to fight in Syria, which hints at the perception of Turks of war as a cause of displacement. Also, it specifically targets male refugees and bases its argument on a heavily patriotic sentiment. A lot of street interviews with Turkish citizens on YouTube echo these sentiments, some of which also features Syrian refugees getting in discussions with Turks and being blamed for not fighting.

While the petition, or street interviews are not isolated phenomena, and rather a reflection of the broader discourse in Turkey, it is also not limited to the country. Czech president at the time, Miloš Zeman, stated that "A large majority of the illegal migrants are young men in good health and single. I wonder why these men are not taking up arms to fight for the freedom of their countries against Islamic State". One of the common themes found in anti-Ukrainian tweets consist of "criticisms of men fleeing Ukraine, such as posts calling Ukrainian men cowards, stemming from the Ukrainian government's decision to bar men between the ages of 18–60 from leaving Ukraine" (Gruzd, Mai and Taleb, 2024), echoing

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[1] A recent one is conducted by Heinrich Boell Stiftung Foundation in Turkey

sentiments similar to what their Syrian counterparts were facing (Rettberg and Gajjala, 2016). The commonality of patriotic and gender elements in these discourses used by politicians and bought and echoed by a certain audience is striking. Are we observing a novel type of patriotism in which loyalty of citizens of other countries also goes into the function, and how this new concept affects attitudes towards refugees? I argue that flight of refugees from rough conditions due to conflict, might not be seen as an involuntary act and shaming it stems from a new understanding of patriotism named Projected Patriotism. Given the at least 100 million forcibly displaced people between 2010-2019[2], it is crucial to understand how perceptions are shaped.

These cases are intriguing, especially when viewed in light of the existing literature on voluntary versus involuntary migration. Past literature often suggests that refugees fleeing involuntarily, such as those escaping persecution or violence, tend to receive more sympathy due to their lack of choice in leaving their home countries. However, the examples presented here challenge this assumption, suggesting that sympathy for refugees may not be as automatic or universal as previously thought. I propose that, under specific conditions, displacement might be perceived as a voluntary act, which could lead to negative perceptions of refugees. This is particularly evident when local populations attribute some level of responsibility to refugees for the situation in their home countries, especially in the context of patriotism and perceived willingness or ability to fight for their homeland.

This raises an important question: How does the reason for migration impact local attitudes toward immigrants? Recent literature on displacement and migration has increasingly

focused on this question, aiming to understand whether the motivations behind migration contribute to differences in how migrants are perceived. A key distinction in this research is between those who migrate voluntarily, such as labor migrants, and those who are forcibly displaced, such as refugees fleeing persecution or violence. The prevailing argument is that voluntary migrants are generally viewed less favorably because they are seen as having greater personal responsibility for their decision to leave, whereas forcibly displaced individuals are often perceived as victims, garnering greater sympathy as a result(Verkuyten, Mepham and Kros, 2018; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Alrababa'h et al., 2021; Arias and Blair, 2022). While the literature supports this broad hypothesis, I argue that these distinctions are based on certain assumptions, and we should revisit how "voluntariness" is understood by host population.

This work addresses the following limitations in the existing literature. First, when comparing migrants based on their reason of migration, refugees or asylum seekers are often described to flee persecution (Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2016; Arias and Blair, 2022)[3]. While this might be the case for a lot of individuals, many of them do not necessarily flee persecution, which signals a deliberate targeting based on religion or ethnicity. Second, it revisits some assumptions about "migrant types". The literature broadly defines two types of migration when it comes to attitude formation: voluntary and involuntary Lynn and Lea (2003); Verkuyten, Mepham and Kros (2018). The evidence generally suggests that involuntary migration of refugees receives a more positive reaction compared to voluntary migration, where the individuals move for economic opportunities Verkuyten, Mepham and

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[3]An exception here is Alrababa'h et al. (2021) in which refugees are also described to flee due to "violence near home" in addition to persecution.

Kros (2018); Alrababa'h et al. (2021); Arias and Blair (2022); Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner (2016). The concept of "voluntariness" in the context of migration or forced displacement is more complex than it might initially appear. I argue that definitions of what constitutes voluntary versus involuntary migration are highly context-dependent and not as clear-cut as they are often portrayed. For example, escaping a situation typically classified as involuntary, as in the case of refugees, might not always be perceived as such by the host population. This perception can lead to negative attitudes towards refugees, unlike expectations. In some cases, even fleeing a devastating event like war may be viewed as a voluntary act, as suggested by certain anecdotes, which complicates our understanding of how migrants are perceived by those in the host country.

This nuanced perspective necessitates a different approach to understanding how host populations perceive migrants. The introduction of the concept of Projected Patriotism offers valuable insights into this complexity by highlighting the diversity of attitudes at the individual level within the host population. Projected Patriotism helps explain why some members of the host society may view refugees who have fled conflict zones with suspicion or objection, considering their flight as a failure to fulfill their patriotic duty to defend their homeland. This framework underscores the importance of considering how varying definitions of voluntariness and patriotism can influence public perceptions of migrants, leading to a broader range of attitudes than previously recognized.

Lastly, the literature overwhelmingly focuses on developed contexts, with some exceptions(Getmansky, Sınmazdemir and Zeitzoff, 2018). Among a Western context such as the United States, I also focus on Turkey, a developing country that hosts a considerable number

of Syrian refugees and some from Ukraine. While considerable research has been done on attitudes towards refugees, they are predominantly in developed countries, and the same focus is yet to be given to developing contexts despite the fact that 83 percent of refugees are hosted in low or middle-income countries [4], and Turkey case is a good candidate to contextualize as the leading country in terms of the number of refugees. In addition to novel hypotheses presented in this paper, existing theories about sociotropic and humanitarian concerns, particularly how reason of migration of the refugees are tested in a developing context, Turkey.

While focusing in two contexts enables me to test my hypotheses in both a developed and a developing country, it also enables to test them with different types of conflict migrants: while host population in Turkey are more exposed to larger scale conflict migrants mainly due to Syrian Civil War and Russian invasion of Ukraine, their counterparts in the United States welcome also refugees from Central America who escape issues due to gang violence, or its indirect effects on other aspects of life, which present a different kind of conflict.

The research findings indicate that while refugees fleeing conflict are generally preferred over economic migrants, this preference is not consistent across all segments of the population, particularly in Turkey. Specifically, the evidence suggests that individuals with high levels of Projected Patriotism exhibit a diminished preference for conflict refugees compared to economic migrants, to the point their perception is not significantly more positive than economic migrants in Turkey. This is a significant departure from the broader trend observed in other groups, where conflict refugees are typically viewed more favorably due to

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[4]https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/

involuntariness of their flight. This finding highlights the complexity of attitudes toward refugees and suggests that patriotic sentiments can play a critical role in shaping public perceptions, potentially overriding the sympathy usually extended to those fleeing violent or life-threatening situations.

2 Literature Review

2.1 How Attitudes Matter

Before discussing the patriotism-related factors that shape attitudes towards refugees, we should understand the implications of perceptions, particularly in the forced displacement context. After all, unless they translate into behaviors, attitudes are abstract, and their implications are limited if not nonexistent. In the forced displacement context, however, especially the negative attitudes of the host population, can serve as means for large-scale, real consequences for refugees, given their vulnerable situation.

Negative attitudes are likely to arise when locals perceive a threat from refugees to their groups in terms of economy, power, and security. These can work in both direct and indirect ways. Direct refers to when the local population takes an action that directly targets refugees and harms them. Security is shown to be a commonly perceived threat that mobilizes the local population Canetti-Nisim, Ariely and Halperin (2008). Interestingly, even the responsibility for past wrongdoings can be attributed to the victim group, which even further solidifies negative attitudes, showing how easily the perceptions can be swayed against refugees Bilali, Tropp and Dasgupta (2012); Glasford, Dovidio and Pratto (2009). Locals can also perceive the refugees as a threat to their dominant position in the domestic hierarchy, particularly when refugees are coethnic with a minority in the population Krcmaric

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(2014); Rüegger (2019); Christensen (2018). Policies such as the provision of aid to refugees can be perceived by locals as they are not being prioritized Fisk (2019), and individuals can resort to violence to achieve their preferred outcome rather than relying on government's decisions Marbach and Ropers (2018).

Indirect mechanisms follow a different path: due to the factors like electoral concerns of politicians, politician profiles and their policymaking are prone to be shaped by anti-refugee attitudes. As a result, their policies can be undesirable for refugees. Municipalities in Denmark where more refugees reside saw a rise in the vote share of anti-refugee, right-wing parties Dustmann, Vasiljeva and Piil Damm (2019). Granting better rights such as freedom of movement not only benefits refugees immediately in terms of living standards, but also actually reduces violence towards them, since it results in more contact and socialization between locals and refugees Savun (2022); Fisk (2019). The key is, the introduction of such policies depends on attitudes towards refugees: it is much more challenging for governments to grant these rights despite their potential benefits when the public discourse is against refugees. Governments can also be responsible for not only their lack of inclusive policies, but also for targeting refugees actively. (Braithwaite et al., 2022) show that governments find it easy to repress refugees during epidemics since they are easy to put the blame on during a crisis, which also aims to deter additional potential refugees from migrating. As these studies show, attitudes are crucial in the formation of real consequences that refugees face.

An emerging literature tackles how the cause of displacement events affects attitudes towards displaced people. Displacements that are deemed as "involuntary" due to events

such as war and natural disasters and economic migration is considered a "voluntary" act. While the former is thought and shown to create more positive feelings than the latter, it is important to examine what constitutes "voluntariness" and whether it is context-dependent.

2.2   Perception of Migrants

2.3   What Makes Displacement Voluntary

The main body of literature is concerned with two approaches. The first one is egocentric political economy, which claims that individuals' attitudes are mainly shaped by their material self-interest. Second is the sociotropic model, which is more altruistic compared to the first one, and the attitudes are shaped by immigrants' overall impact on the host population (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014, 2015; Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2016; Dempster and Hargrave, 2017). This study speaks to a growing literature that aims to disentangle the effect of the events that cause displacement. In this line, studies grapple with whether voluntariness in migration affects how locals perceive immigrants. Economic migrants, who move to have better opportunities, are considered voluntary migrants and perceived as acting on self-interest compared to refugees who escape persecution. The divergence between the responsibility of these two types creates different emotions in public Weiner (1995); De Waal (2008), which reflects as more sympathy towards involuntary ones than others Verkuyten, Mepham and Kros (2018). While persecution is shown to cause more positive attitudes towards migrants than economic migration in both developing Alrababa'h et al. (2021) and developed Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner (2016) contexts, there is also evidence that refugees who are persecuted are perceived more positively than the ones who fled due to climate change, representing another type of involuntary migration Arias and

Blair (2022). Voluntariness in this literature is shown to be a strong predictor of attitudes towards refugees and these studies are based on the common assumption that persecution is perceived as an involuntary displacement[5], which I argue is not necessarily the case due to how people judge others based on their projections of ideas on them. Individuals often make projections of how they would behave if they were in the shoes of others with their understanding of their own personalities, and the situation of others, often with limited input. This "projection-based" judgment is an important factor when it comes to understanding intergroup interactions in political contexts, and remains underexplored. As a subbranch of this approach, I argue that studying attitudes towards forcibly displaced people, particularly in a conflict context, requires a new understanding of patriotism which projects an individual's patriotic responsibilities to other people.

2.4   Nationalism and Patriotism

Before introducing Projected Patriotism, we need to understand how nationalism and patriotism have been defined and the debates surrounding it in the literature. Patriotism and nationalism are related but distinct. Nationalism often emphasizes an ethnocentric pride or exclusivist identity implying superiority, which can sometimes lead to hostility toward outgroups or those perceived as "outsiders" to the nation (). In contrast, patriotism is generally seen as love for one's country, tied to a sense of civic pride and positive regard for its ideals, often with an emphasis on democratic values . While there is not a single definition the literature agrees on, arguably there is a consensus that it describes some sort of duty of

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[5]Thanks to a survey experiment in Kenya and Vietnam, Spilker et al. (2020) find that while economic and climate migrants seem to be tied in how favorable they are seen, persecuted migrants are perceived less favorably than these. While it is an important contribution since it focuses on a developing context, this study deals with internal migration, which mainly leaves out crucial sociocultural determinants associated with international migration.

sacrificing oneself for the group they belong, stemming from a sense of loyalty and connection. For the most part, the group corresponds to the individual's nation, although there have been attempts to relax it more recently. Theorizing patriotism has been a challenge since many thinkers viewed it as insufficient as a philosophy Canovan (2000), or perceived it as comparable to racism Gomberg (1990). One of the pillars of patriotism that led thinkers to overlook it, according to its critics, is its exclusionary tendency that excludes others who do not belong to that specific political community Sardoč (2020). This, unequivocally, makes patriotism subjective in their eyes Nathanson (2020). To deal with its exclusionary nature, there have been recent attempts to theorize patriotism more thoroughly. This new wave of literature produced several sub-definitions of patriotism including constitutional patriotism Müller (2006), moderate patriotism Nathanson (1989), democratic patriotism, and critical patriotism Merry (2009), blind and constructive patriotism Schatz, Staub and Lavine (1999) among others. Going into detail about each definition would not be in the scope of this work. The main idea behind this proliferation is to understand the degree of how strict people's understanding of patriotism is when it comes to who belongs to the group they should sacrifice for (ethnic, citizenship ties, or "people of world" as is the case in cosmopolitan patriotism), what should be the sacrifice, both on the negative (e.g., dying during a war) and positive (e.g., contributing to society by social programs) ends, and what are the conditions under which patriotic duties should be at place, if there are any (e.g., duties should be served no matter what as in blind patriotism, or they are rather determined depending on certain attributes of the entity as in critical patriotism). These attempts not only try to build a more ethically defensible patriotism but also help us understand how individuals view and apply patriotism in a much wider scope.

Individuals' identification with nationalism and patriotism imply different attitudinal outcomes when it comes to migrant and/or refugee attitudes. Nationalism suggests a strong preference for preserving national homogeneity while highlighting distinctions from other nations. In this perspective on nationhood, citizens are bound by a shared cultural heritage or ancestry, and immigrants are often perceived as "outsiders" who may disrupt national unity. Consequently, support for nationalism is consistently linked to unfavorable attitudes toward immigration (Coenders, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2017; Blank and Schmidt, 2003). Patriotism, by contrast, signifies pride and loyalty for one's country, which can also include its political institutions, such as democracy (Elkins and de Figueiredo, 2003). It involves a positive view of the country that does not rely on comparing it to others (Mummendey, Klink and Brown, 2001). This form of attachment aligns well with tolerance for immigrant groups and democratic ideals, including integrating minorities into the national community. Studies frequently find that patriotic attachment is either unrelated to attitudes on immigration Elkins and de Figueiredo (2003) or even associated with supportive views on immigration (Blank and Schmidt, 2003).Wagner et al. (2012) argue that endorsement of democratic values, like pride in the welfare system and democratic institutions, are core aspects of patriotism that can reduce negative views on immigration. However, pride in one's nation also involves attachment to it, which explains why patriotism often shows a positive correlation with nationalism (Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989). Despite the fact that these efforts attempt to widen the much narrower initial definition of patriotism by opening the way to include others, one aspect of patriotism still remains unexplored, independent of how the constituents are determined: Is there any perceived duty for members of other groups that they are supposed to satisfy? To put more concretely, should citizens be patriotic for

their own country according to citizens of another country? Patriotism literature so far deals with how to define the terms of specific relationship between one or their compatriots and their own country. However, this excludes the fact that people can actually take into consideration the patriotic relationship between another country and its own citizens. Based on this consideration, lack of fulfilling patriotic duties towards one's own country can be perceived as a signal of lack of loyalty. This fulfillment can be expected as an act of virtue. As a result, this failure of engaging in patriotic acts can cause individuals in host population to judge, deem others in another region less deserving, which is an important driver of attitudes towards refugees with respect to humanitarian concerns as we have been observing in forced displacement context(Arias and Blair, 2022). This question is yet to be tackled despite its worthiness both in terms of ethical consistency of patriotism as a philosophy, especially for its more partial definitions and understanding the stance of people in this matter.

Anti-refugee sentiments based on Projected Patriotism present a novel form of objection. Rhetoric against refugees often argue about their negative impact on economy (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Burns and Gimpel, 2000), security (Lischer, 2005; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006), or culture (Loescher and Milner, 2004), which are based on some utility calculation find its roots in sociotropic or egocentric approaches. Studies often use information-correcting treatments or emotion-provoking nudges to tackle these objections. On the other hand, shaming of refugees due to not staying and fighting in their countries present a moral argument, and how to effectively counter this sentiment is not immediately clear. Thus, understanding this concept and its role in attitudes towards conflict refugees would be the first step to produce research testing the effectiveness of potential interventions in mitigating

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associated rhetoric.

3   Concept of Projected Patriotism

Despite considerable conceptual expansion in the literature on patriotism—from debates over its boundaries to disputes over its normative valence—scholars have largely focused on the nature of one's own relationship to their country. These efforts have enriched our understanding of patriotism as a multidimensional phenomenon, spanning uncritical attachment (blind patriotism) to constructive and conditional loyalty (constructive patriotism). Yet, a key blind spot remains: What do individuals expect of others in their relationship to their country? Put differently, should members of another group (Y) feel patriotic toward their own nation in the eyes of members of group X?

To explore this missing dimension, I introduce the concept of Projected Patriotism: the belief that others - particularly members of outgroups - should demonstrate patriotic attachment to their own nation. This is not simply a matter of personal loyalty; rather, it is a normative expectation that patriotism is a virtue all people ought to perform. Drawing an analogy from the literature on friendship (MacIntyre, 2013; Goodin, 1988), patriotism is often framed as a thick, relational duty - one that binds citizens together through sacrifice, loyalty, and belonging. But just as we sometimes judge strangers for betraying their friends, individuals may also judge others - especially migrants or foreigners - for failing to exhibit patriotic attachment to their homeland, even if those individuals are not part of the ingroup.

Projected Patriotism thus operates at a different analytical level than existing patriotism concepts. Whereas blind and constructive patriotism describe one's own orientation toward

the nation, Projected Patriotism is outward-facing. It reflects the standards one uses to evaluate others' relationship to their country. Critically, it does not require that the observer themselves be especially patriotic - someone who scores low on blind or constructive patriotism may still believe that "everyone should love their own country."

At its core, Projected Patriotism is a unidimensional construct that captures variation in how strongly individuals endorse this expectation. While it shares some attitudinal terrain with existing patriotism scales, especially those that emphasize loyalty and identity, it is conceptually distinct in both its directionality (outward-facing) and its moral prescriptiveness. Individuals high on Projected Patriotism do not merely observe patriotism in others; they believe it ought to be there - and its absence invites scrutiny or moral judgment.

Understanding when and where Projected Patriotism becomes politically salient requires identifying its scope conditions. In the tradition of concept formation in political science (Gerring, 1999; Goertz, 2006, 2020), scope conditions clarify where a concept is applicable, and under what empirical circumstances its presence can be meaningfully observed. I argue that two macro-level factors are especially important: the salience of forced migration, and public discourse around national obligation. In contexts where refugee presence is politically charged - due to scale, elite polarization, or media attention—citizens are more likely to activate judgments about the behavior and worthiness of these newcomers. At the same time, national discourses that emphasize duty, sacrifice, or compulsory service (e.g., military conscription) provide a normative backdrop that makes expectations of loyalty more intuitive and legitimate. These two forces - migration salience and national obligation culture - jointly structure the environments where Projected Patriotism is most likely to emerge and matter.

Moreover, this concept has downstream consequences. Individuals high in Projected Patriotism are likely to interpret refugee behavior through the lens of national loyalty-judging asylum-seekers' worthiness based not just on need, but on whether they seem to honor or betray their own homeland. This has important implications for political psychology and migration studies, offering a fresh lens through which to examine perceptions of deservingness, integration, and national belonging.

4 How Conflict Refugees are Perceived

The leading reason of forced displacement is violence. According to UNHCR, 117.3 Million people have been displaced by the end of 2023 at the end of 2023 as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations or events seriously disturbing public order, 37.6 million of which are refugees[6].

When exploring how humanitarian concerns drive attitudes towards refugees, the focus has been given to reason of migration. While economic migrants are considered voluntary, due to higher control over their situation, and perceived lack of deservingness as a result, refugees are considered involuntary due to lesser control over their situation, which makes them more deserving of a new home. To test this argument, studies compare refugees who flee persecution to migrants who migrate for better economic opportunities. While this comparison is in line with the theory when testing voluntariness, fleeing persecution likely can not adequately capture the situation of conflict migrants as a whole. Although acts of persecution can be found in various conflicts, many refugees are forced to leave their homes due to damages that are not necessarily targeted to themselves, unlike what persecution

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[6]https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/

signals in terms of ethnicity or religion. Deliberate targeting, as in persecution, possibly awakens more sympathy towards refugees who are persecuted due to their perceived victim status. To have a better assessment of how conflict refugees are perceived compared to economic migrants, in addition to persecution, I also test the effect of different conflict types, namely civil war, invasion, and gang violence. This enables us to test how humanitarian concerns shape attitudes based on reason of migration with a wider range of reasons, which more accurately describes a larger number of refugees, unlike persecution. I argue that refugees who flee civil war, invasion, and gang violence are considered more involuntary, hence, more deserving of a new home than migrants who migrate for economic opportunities.

H_1: *Refugees who flee common forms of conflict such as civil war, invasion, and gang violence will be perceived more favorably than economic migrants.*

4.1 How Projected Patriotism Affects Attitudes

4.1.1 Perception of Fighting

The voluntary perception of economic migrants and involuntary perception of refugees are well established, at least on a theoretical level. However, this distinction is still too broad even after accounting for different types of conflict. Host populations are expected to perceive refugees involuntary. However, this is at odds with the experience of many refugees and the sentiment against them (Rettberg and Gajjala, 2016; Ozduzen, Korkut and Ozduzen, 2021). Curiously, they are not judged or shamed despite the fact that they fled conflict in their countries, but the very reason they are exposed to antagonistic sentiments is their flight. This points to a need in migration literature: Under what conditions these migrants are perceived to flee their homes voluntarily? To address this gap, it is important

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to understand how Projected Patriotism relates to attitudes towards refugees with respect to the voluntariness of displacement. The voluntariness attributed to fighting is based on the expectation of locals from the refugee in a conflict. This expectation comes from perceiving one's community as worthy of defending or fighting for at all costs. While this concept is at the heart of patriotism or nationalism, these definitions focus specifically on one's relationship with their own country and nation, and neither of them (nor their subcategories) necessarily suggests an imperative about people of other countries. A patriot can think that they and their fellow citizens should do their best for the betterment of their country, but it may not translate to the citizens of other countries and attribute responsibilities to their citizens. This, supposedly, implies indifference. However, the rhetoric used against refugees in recent events suggests an extension of patriotism beyond borders. Hence, I argue that people who have Projected Patriotism tendencies are more likely to attribute voluntariness to escaping from war and perceive these refugees less positively.

H₂: *Compared to individuals with low Projected Patriotism, individuals with high Projected Patriotism will not perceive refugees as favorably who flee common forms of conflict such as civil war, invasion, and gang violence than economic migrants.*

5 Research Design

To test my hypotheses, I conducted a randomized conjoint experiment (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014) in Turkey and the United States to determine how specific attributes of migrants affect host populations' willingness to host them. The hypotheses for this experiment were stated in the Pre-Analysis Plan and pre-registered in August 2024, before the

experiment was carried out.

The decision to conduct the study in Turkey and the United States reflects both theoretical and empirical motivations. These two countries present contrasting but complementary cases for evaluating how normative expectations like Projected Patriotism shape attitudes toward migrants. Turkey has hosted one of the largest refugee populations in the world over the past decade - primarily from neighboring Syria - making forced migration a visible and politicized issue in public life. National obligation discourse in Turkey is also especially salient due to the continuation of mandatory military service, state-promoted narratives of national sacrifice, and the central role of the state in defining who belongs. In contrast, the United States presents a liberal-democratic context with an all-volunteer military and a patriotism that is more often symbolic than compulsory. Yet the U.S. political climate has also made forced migration - particularly from Latin America and conflict zones - a site of significant political polarization. Taken together, these cases offer variation along two theoretically relevant dimensions: The salience of forced migration and the strength and character of national obligation discourse. These conditions help test whether Projected Patriotism is both activated and consequential in different cultural and political settings, and they offer a preliminary window into the concept's scope conditions.

In the conjoint experiment, participants were presented with pairs of hypothetical migrant profiles. No country of origin was mentioned in the experiment to avoid potential biases that could be associated with them. This also helps preclude potential restrictions such that certain types of conflict are not realistic for certain regions. Each profile included six attributes: gender, age, occupation, religion, language fluency, and reason for leaving, and

these attributes were randomized.

Respondents first rated each profile on a scale of 1 to 7 to indicate whether their country should admit the migrants, then chose which of the two profiles they preferred their country to admit. The former, rating outcome, was the primary outcome, but similar results were observed in the forced choice outcome. Each respondent assessed seven pairs of profiles for the conjoint analysis. The order of attributes was also randomized for each respondent.

The attributes associated with each migrant profile were meticulously designed to align with various theoretical predictions regarding public attitudes toward migrants. For instance, if respondents' attitudes are shaped by sociotropic economic concerns, it is anticipated that they would exhibit a preference for migrant profiles associated with higher-skilled employment, such as those of teachers or doctors. These professions are typically seen as more likely to contribute positively to the economy, making such profiles more appealing. Furthermore, respondents might be inclined to favor migrants who have the financial means to support themselves independently, as opposed to those who might depend on public assistance.

To delve into the influence of cultural concerns on respondents' attitudes toward migrants, religion was incorporated as a crucial indicator of cultural identity and perceived threat, drawing on previous research (Campbell, 2006; Kalkan, Layman and Uslaner, 2009; Edgell et al., 2016; Hellwig and Sinno, 2017; De Coninck, 2023). The migrant profiles were randomly assigned religious affiliations, including Agnostic, Christian, or Muslim, to examine potential biases. It was hypothesized that in the United States, respondents would be more likely to favor Christian migrants, reflecting a cultural alignment, whereas in Turkey, Muslim migrants would be preferred due to the dominant cultural and religious context.

Additionally, if respondents' attitudes are significantly influenced by humanitarian concerns, it was expected that they would show a preference for migrant profiles indicating greater vulnerability. This might include a preference for female migrants over male ones, as well as for those fleeing severe threats such as persecution, civil war, invasion, and gang violence, rather than those migrating primarily for economic opportunities. This expectation rests on the assumption that heightened vulnerability would elicit a stronger empathetic response, leading to more favorable attitudes toward these migrants.

To measure Projected Patriotism, respondents were presented with five statements and asked to indicate their agreement on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." These items were designed to assess the extent to which individuals expect others—particularly migrants—to express patriotic sentiments toward their country of origin. The items were as follows:

Projected Patriotism Measure: Please state how much do you agree or disagree with each of the statements. (1: Strongly disagree, 5: Strongly agree)

- People who are not Americans should feel loyal to their own country.

- Citizens of other countries should serve their country in any way they can, independent of what their country is.

- I value the importance of non-Americans prioritizing their own country.

- Defending one's country is a noble patriotic duty, and individuals should defend their own country, even if it is against my country.

- No matter what those policies are, people of other countries should support their own

national policy. society.

Evidence of the scale's unidimensionality, internal consistency, and distinctiveness from related concepts is presented in the Results section. The full questionnaire, including all other items is provided in the Appendix.

6   Results and Discussion

6.1   Measurement and Validation of Projected Patriotism

To evaluate whether the five items reliably capture a single underlying construct of Projected Patriotism, I conducted a series of psychometric validation tests. These included Exploratory Graph Analysis (EGA), Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), and convergent and discriminant validity assessments. Each test offers a distinct yet complementary justification for the scale's internal coherence and external validity.

I began with Exploratory Graph Analysis, a network psychometric approach that identifies the dimensional structure of a scale by detecting communities in a network of partial correlations between items. EGA is increasingly used in psychological and political behavior research because it does not rely on subjective cutoffs or restrictive linear assumptions, and is particularly suited for testing the dimensionality of attitudinal constructs with a small number of items (Golino and Epskamp, 2017; Christensen, Golino and Silvia, 2020). In both Turkey and the United States, EGA consistently recovered a unidimensional structure, with 100% replication across 500 parametric bootstrap samples. This suggests that the five items cohere around a single latent trait, supporting the internal structure of the construct.

To formally test this unidimensional structure and assess model fit, I conducted a con-

firmatory factor analysis (CFA) separately in each country. The evidence suggests that the one-factor model fit the data well. In Turkey, the CFA yielded an RMSEA of 0.065, SRMR of 0.025, CFI of 0.976, and TLI of 0.952. In the U.S., model fit was slightly weaker but still within the range typically considered acceptable for short attitudinal scales (RMSEA = 0.087, SRMR = 0.043, CFI = 0.945, TLI = 0.891). These results indicate that the hypothesized single-factor structure accounts for the relationships among the five items in both samples. The factor loadings were moderate to strong, ranging from 0.53 to 0.69 in Turkey and similarly in the U.S., suggesting that each item makes a meaningful contribution to the overall construct.

The factor also explained a substantial proportion of item variance. In Turkey, the single factor accounted for 45.5% of the variance in the five items (SS = 2.277), while in the U.S. it explained 38.3% (SS = 1.92). These levels of explained variance are typical for psychological constructs involving complex social or political judgments, especially those measured with relatively few items.

To assess the distinctiveness of Projected Patriotism from existing patriotism subtypes, I conducted convergent and discriminant validity checks using a separate sample in the United States as well as the full sample from Turkey. In both contexts, the patterns of association were notably similar. In the U.S., Projected Patriotism was moderately correlated with blind patriotism (r = 0.35) and weakly correlated with constructive patriotism (r = 0.19). In Turkey, the correlations followed the same rank order and were comparably sized: r = 0.33 with blind patriotism and r = 0.32 with constructive patriotism. While there is a slightly stronger association with blind patriotism in both cases, the differences are not stark.

These consistent patterns across two very different national contexts support the notion that Projected Patriotism is conceptually adjacent to—but not reducible to—existing patriotism subtypes. It captures a distinct form of normative belief: the idea that others - especially migrants - ought to demonstrate patriotic attachment to their own country of origin.

Taken together, these results provide support for the construct validity of Projected Patriotism. There is evidence from both contexts, the United States and Turkey, suggesting that the scale is unidimensional, internally consistent, and externally distinct from related constructs such as blind and constructive patriotism. These psychometric properties justify its use in analyzing the role of Projected Patriotism in shaping public attitudes toward migrants across national contexts.

6.2 Experimental Results

I employed the standard methodology for analyzing randomized conjoint experiments by using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with standard errors clustered by respondent to estimate the average marginal component effect (AMCE) for each attribute. The AMCE reflects the marginal effect of an attribute averaged across the joint distribution of the other attributes (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Figures 1-4 illustrate the AMCE for rating outcomes, where each dot represents the AMCE on the probability that respondents would choose to admit the migrant to their countries[7]. Due to multiple hypotheses being tested, adjusted p-values are also presented in Tables 1-2, using Bonferroni correction.

Consistent with the first hypothesis, conflict refugees are perceived more positively than economic migrants in both countries across all conflict types, except for gang violence in

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[7]The horizontal lines represent Bonferroni adjusted confidence intervals (CIs)

Turkey sample, which are presented in Figures 1-2, and Tables 1-2 in the Appendix. In the US sample, refugees displaced due to gang violence, ethnic or religious persecution, civil war or home country being invaded are .38, .44, .56, and .61 points more likely to be admitted to the host country than migrants who leave for economic opportunities. In Turkey sample, refugees who are displaced due to gang violence, ethnic or religious persecution, civil war or home country being invaded are .12, .31, .20, and .27 points more likely to be admitted to host country than migrants who leave for economic opportunities. While the difference between economic migrants and individuals who flee gang violence is not statistically significant for either unadjusted or adjusted p-values, for civil war treatment, unadjusted and adjusted p-values are below .05 and .1 respectively, which suggests a partial evidence. Home country being invaded and ethnic or religious persecution both produce p-values below .05, unadjusted or adjusted.

These results suggest that conflict types elicit different levels of positive perceptions compared to economic migrants, and these differences vary by context. Refugees who flee invasion are perceived more positively than other refugees in both contexts. Invasion might signal being the target of a political aggression, which could add further to the victimization of refugees who flee these events, compared to others. Comparatively speaking, civil war refugees perform better against economic migrants in the U.S. than they do in Turkey. The fact that majority of refugees in Turkey fleeing from Syria could explain this discrepancy. There is a belief among some Turks that Syrians are no longer civil war refugees and can actually go back to Syria, which especially gets heightened during religious holidays when some Syrians visit their relatives and come back to Turkey. A potential association of civil

Figure 1: Results from the conjoint experiment on general sample with rating outcome, U.S. Plots show the effect of each treatment compared to baseline condition for each attribute on the left. The rating outcome takes values from 1 to 7. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level and Bonferroni adjustment is used on confidence intervals.

Figure 2: Results from the conjoint experiment on general sample with rating outcome, U.S. Plots show the effect of each treatment compared to baseline condition for each attribute on the left. The rating outcome takes values from 1 to 7. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level and Bonferroni adjustment is used on confidence intervals.

war treatment with Syrians could have caused a decrease in this treatment for some Turkish respondents. Gang violence is the only treatment that did not produce any statistically significant difference compared to economic migrants in Turkey. Turks likely are much more familiar with invasion and civil war as conflict types, both due to way more global coverage of such events, and Ukrainian and Syrian refugees who fled them respectively in Turkey, while gang violence is possibly not a conflict type they are familiar with unlike their American counterparts who are more exposed to sentiments centered around Central American refugees in domestic politics. It is possible that their lack of information and familiarity about gang violence cause them to underestimate its destructive and destabilizing impacts on societies.

Overall, there is considerable evidence in both contexts that individuals who are displaced due to conflict events in general are perceived more positively than economic migrants.

The second hypothesis, which posits that favorability of conflict refugees compared to economic migrants would disappear in the eyes of individuals with Projected Patriotism, holds in the Turkey sample, but not the U.S. sample, as presented in Figures 3-4. To test this hypothesis, the sample in both countries is divided into two: Respondent with High Projected Patriotism, meaning having more than average score, and respondents with low Projected Patriotism, meaning having less than average Projected Patriotism score. In the US sample of respondents with high Projected Patriotism, refugees displaced due to gang violence, ethnic or religious persecution, civil war or home country being invaded are .36, .36, .55, and .56 points more likely to be admitted to host country than migrants who leave for economic opportunities. Their comparative favorability against economic migrants drops slightly in high Projected Patriotism sample compared to both general and Low Projected

Figure 3: Plots comparing refugees to economic migrants based on reason for leaving, in three samples: General, Individuals with High Projected Patriotism, meaning above average, and Individuals with Low Projected Patriotism, meaning below average, in Turkey. Plots show the effect of each conflict treatment compared to baseline condition, economic opportunities, at 0. The rating outcome takes values from 1 to 7. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level and Bonferroni adjustment is used on confidence intervals.

Figure 4: Plots comparing refugees to economic migrants based on reason for leaving, in three samples: General, Individuals with High Projected Patriotism, meaning above average, and Individuals with Low Projected Patriotism, meaning below average, in the U.S. Plots show the effect of each conflict treatment compared to baseline condition, economic opportunities, at 0. The rating outcome takes values from 1 to 7. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level and Bonferroni adjustment is used on confidence intervals.

Patriotism samples, however, both adjusted and unadjusted p-value of all refugee treatments are below .05. This suggests that while there seems to be a slight negative shift in perceptions towards refugees for respondents with high Projected Patriotism, they are still perceived more positively than economic migrants.

In Turkey sample of respondents with high Projected Patriotism, refugees displaced due to gang violence, ethnic or religious persecution, civil war or home country being invaded are .10, .16, .13, and .19 points more likely to be admitted to host country than migrants who leave for economic opportunities. Their comparative favorability against economic migrants drops significantly in high Projected Patriotism sample compared to both general and Low Projected Patriotism samples, and none of adjusted and unadjusted p-value of any refugee treatments are below the threshold value of .05. This supports the expectation presented in Hypothesis 2. This discrepancy suggests a difference in how citizens in Turkey and the United States perceive patriotism in general, particularly with respect to fighting for one's country. It is important to understand the relationship between military service and patriotism in both contexts, especially with respect to the practice of conscription.

The legacy of the Ottoman Empire and the War of Independence, which led to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, has embedded a strong sense of national pride and duty in the Turkish psyche. The Turkish military has historically been seen as a guardian of national sovereignty and unity, and this view is reflected in the high regard for military service (Ahmad, 1993). In contemporary Turkey, military service is considered a rite of passage for many young men, with strong societal expectations surrounding it. The requirement to serve in the military is viewed as a demonstration of loyalty and commitment

to the country. The military's role in Turkish society is bolstered by its integration into national ceremonies and public life, reinforcing its symbolic importance (Kosebalaban, 2007). Military service is also a significant factor in shaping national identity. Public ceremonies, such as those celebrating military achievements and national holidays, often highlight the contributions of soldiers and veterans, fostering a collective sense of pride and patriotism. This cultural emphasis on military service reflects a broader societal belief in the importance of defense and national security and the role of citizens. Despite the debates about how to balance traditional values of military service with contemporary realities prompted by the increasing use of professional soldiers and the evolving nature of military conflicts Altinay (2004), military service is still a significant factor in shaping patriotic identity in Turkey.

On the other hand, the notion of "citizen-soldier" and its evolution can be helpful in the United States context. A "citizen-soldier" refers to an individual who temporarily leaves their civilian life to serve in the military, embodying the idea that defense of the nation is a civic duty shared by all citizens. This concept is rooted in the belief that military service should be a responsibility of ordinary citizens rather than a professional class, ensuring that those who defend the nation are representative of the society they protect. The citizen-soldier embodies the idea that military service is a civic duty, a responsibility shared by all able-bodied citizens, contrasting sharply with a professional military where service is a career choice rather than a universal obligation. This figure is not a career military personnel but a civilian who serves temporarily, often in times of national emergency or conflict, before returning to civilian life. This temporary nature of service underscores the concept that the military is an extension of civilian society. Moreover, the citizen-soldier is ideally demographically and

socioeconomically representative of the broader society, ensuring that the military remains connected to the population it serves, fostering a sense of shared sacrifice and national unity. The motivations driving citizen-soldiers are often rooted in patriotism and a sense of obligation to the nation, rather than personal gain or professional advancement, which sets them apart from those who serve in a volunteer military, where the motivations may be more individualistic.

The decline of the citizen-soldier in the United States is frequently linked to the abolition of conscription and the establishment of an all-volunteer force (AVF) in 1973 (Burk, 2001; Cohen, 2001). It is argued that this change represented a departure from the notion of military service as a civic responsibility to being viewed as a career option(Segal, 1989; Cohen, 2001). The introduction of the AVF replaced the citizen-soldier with "homo economicus", motivated by the skills, salary, and educational benefits provided by military service, rather than by patriotism or duty (Moskos Jr, 1977). These scholars contend that the decline of the citizen-soldier has weakened the concept of American citizenship. Citizenship traditionally involves a reciprocal relationship between the state and its citizens, with both rights to be respected and duties to be fulfilled. Essentially, Americans have embraced a liberal model of citizenship that lacks a strong foundation for civic duty. According to these scholars, the transition to an all-volunteer force (AVF) has significantly contributed to this shift, as military service—one of the few substantial demands the state places on its citizens—has been transformed into just another job. This redefinition implies that civic virtue, particularly with respect to military service, is no longer a primary value.

The patriotism projected by Americans and Turks are likely different, especially consid-

ering the argued demise of "citizen soldier" concept triggered by establishment of AVF. This discrepancy in how military service is perceived in patriotic and nationalist identity could inform how their projected patriotism translates into their attitudes towards refugees.

The results also provide support for the hypothesis that non-humanitarian concerns shape attitudes toward migrants and refugees in both countries, as presented in both Tables 1-2 and Figures 1-2. On the sociotropic economic aspect, the fact that respondents prefer refugees who are doctors provides some support for this hypothesis. The particularly sizable effects for the religious attributes provide support for the hypothesis that Americans and Turks are wary of potential cultural differences with migrants and refugees arriving to the country, and that they are much less likely to welcome those refugees who appear to fall outside the country's cultural mainstream. While Americans prefer Christian refugees, Turks prefer Muslim ones as expected, and it is important to note that respondents in both countries prefer agnostic refugees rather than the ones with the other religion. This suggests that the perceived threats of refugees also vary among ones who do not share the mainstream religion of the host country. Respondents in both contexts also prefer fluent speakers of their languages. Being a fluent speaker can help refugees both integrate easier, and enable them to utilize their skills in the workforce more effectively. This preference underlines the importance of both economic and cultural sociotropic concerns.

Lastly, to explore subgroup effects, marginal means are estimated on demographic traits of respondents such as race/ethnicity, age, gender, education, partisanship, and employment. In the United States, young, female or Republican respondents provided more support for migrant profiles than old or male respondents across different attributes. In Turkey, re-

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spondents who are college educated, pro-government or who identify as Turk rated migrant profiles higher than those who are not college educated or who identify as a group other than Turk. While these analyses are not at the core of this paper, they could provide insights into overall attitudes of certain groups towards migrants based on demographic traits in each country.

7 Conclusion

This paper provides quantitative evidence on the factors that drive attitude formation toward migrant populations in both a developed and a developing context. First, these findings demonstrate the limitations of the existing theory that refugees, due to perceived involuntariness in their fleeing, are viewed more positively than economic migrants. Evidence suggests that individuals with high levels of Projected Patriotism in Turkey do not prefer refugees more than economic migrants. According to these individuals, staying and fighting for one's country is a patriotic obligation, which renders fleeing a voluntary and even blameworthy act. This result introduces a theoretically novel mechanism that helps explain variation in public preferences toward conflict migrants—one rooted in expectations of others' national loyalty rather than just the migrants' vulnerability or capacity.

Second, this paper tests the effect of common conflict types such as invasion, civil war, and gang violence as reasons for leaving, in addition to persecution. This provides further evidence for how humanitarian concerns shape attitudes. Moreover, it is important to emphasize the heterogeneity in the effects of these events: certain reasons, such as civil war or gang violence, may not generate as much support as others like invasion or persecution, particularly in Turkey. These findings caution against overgeneralized assumptions about

the uniformly positive effect of humanitarian framing in host country preferences.

In addition to these core hypotheses, this study contributes to our understanding of how non-humanitarian concerns—especially political and cultural—shape attitudes toward migrants. Respondents in both countries prefer refugees who are more skilled, speak the dominant language better, and share the mainstream religion of the host country. These patterns are consistent with established theories that emphasize the role of sociotropic economic and cultural concerns in shaping support for migration.

A further contribution of this paper lies in the development and validation of a new psychological construct: Projected Patriotism. Through rigorous psychometric testing—including factor analysis, dimensionality checks, and convergence assessments—this study establishes PP as a distinct and reliable concept that captures individuals' expectations that others, particularly migrants, should remain loyal to their own country. The fact that this construct behaves similarly across both Turkey and the United States, while also showing meaningful variation in predictive power, suggests it is conceptually transportable and empirically useful. Its successful validation in two very different national contexts offers a strong foundation for future research on how perceived duties of patriotism are projected onto others, especially under conditions of forced displacement.

More broadly, this paper offers a framework for connecting national attachment, conflict framing, and attitudes toward migrants across contexts. In doing so, it not only enhances our understanding of how individual-level dispositions interact with conflict-based migrant attributes, but also provides a validated tool—Projected Patriotism—that can be used in future work on migration, nationalism, and political psychology.

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A Supplemental Information

A.1 Pre-Registration

This study was pre-registered with Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP).

A.2 Sample

I carried out a conjoint experiment with nationally representative samples of adult citizens (aged 18 and older) in the U.S. and Turkey. The study was conducted using Prolific for the United States, and benderimki.com for Turkey, both of which have been used in research published in reputable articles in political science. Each experiment aimed to include 1,000 respondents per country. The experiments were conducted in August 2024.

I collected data on pre-treatment variables identified as important by my theory and previous literature. Detailed measures of Projected Patriotism can be found in the Survey Texts section of this appendix, others are in the Pre-Analysis Plan. Variables collected included age, gender, education, ideology, political party/stance, employment and race/ethnicity. Ideology was assessed on a categorical basis, including conservative, liberal and neither conservative nor liberal in the US, and left, right and neither in Turkey. Similarly, political party/stance was measured categorically as Republican, Democrat, and Independent in the US, and pro-government, pro-opposition and neither in Turkey.

Projected Patriotism is measured using multiple-item indices, with each question response on a 1-5 scale. For each index, an index was created as the mean across the four questions, resulting in a final outcome on a 1-5 scale.

A.3 Experimental Design

In the survey experiment, all hypotheses were evaluated using a rating and choice-based conjoint design. Unlike traditional experimental approaches that often restrict researchers to manipulating only a few variables, conjoint designs are better suited for capturing complex phenomena by allowing for the isolation of multiple factors that contribute to a single effect. In this design, respondents are randomly assigned to view a subset of levels across a set of features, effectively reimagining the treatment as a matrix of features and levels from which a sample is drawn. Conjoint designs rely on several pooling assumptions similar to those in standard within-subjects experiments, such as the stability of responses, the absence of carryover effects, and the lack of profile-order effects on potential outcomes, alongside the randomization of profiles to ensure pairwise independence (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). The number of tasks and attributes was carefully chosen to maximize statistical power while maintaining the integrity of the responses (Bansak et al., 2018).

The attribute levels were varied randomly both within each profile and across the different profiles shown to respondents, with each level assigned a uniform probability of being selected. Moreover, the order in which attributes were presented to each respondent was also randomized. The conjoint design applied in both the U.S. and Turkey was identical, with one exception: the term "agnostic" was replaced with "nonbeliever" in Turkey to better align with the local cultural context.

I followed the procedure outlined by Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) to estimate the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE). The AMCE measures the increased probability that a migrant profile would be chosen from the baseline to a given level, averaged

across all possible levels of the other attributes. This approach helps us understand the importance of each attribute in shaping individual migration attitudes by averaging the effects of different attributes over the distribution of other attributes, which are conditionally independent. The AMCE is a nonparametric estimator that benefits from full randomization and orthogonality of attributes, meaning that even though some combinations of attribute levels are never shown, the relative importance of attributes can still be estimated because their distributions relative to other attributes are consistent. Unlike traditional model-based approaches to studying behavior, this method does not rely on specific mechanisms by which individuals reach a particular decision.

I gathered two outcome measures for the migrant profiles: the ratings task and the forced-choice task. The rating outcome has the advantage of allowing the respondent to reject both profiles and to vary in their intensity of preferences, unlike the forced choice outcome which assigns larger weight to respondents with more intense preferences over attributes. The rating outcome is primarily used in this study and can take a value between 1 and 7, 1 indicating the profile should definitely not be admitted, and 7 indicating the profile should definitely be admitted. AMCEs were estimated by regressing the outcome on the full set of attribute levels, which were operationalized as indicator variables. One reference category was omitted for each indicator variable, serving as the baseline level for that attribute. Standard errors were clustered at the respondent level, as each respondent completed multiple choice tasks.

Table 1: AMCE, Turkey Sample (Compared to baseline levels- Rating Outcome

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	P-value	Adjusted P-value
1	Age	38	0.024	0.064	0.711	1
2	Age	61	-0.030	0.068	0.660	1
3	Gender	Female	0.308	0.050	0.000	0.000
4	Language.Fluency	Broken	0.141	0.062	0.024	0.118
5	Language.Fluency	Fluent	0.347	0.068	0.000	0.000
6	Occupation	Doctor	0.391	0.065	0.000	0.000
7	Occupation	Teacher	0.179	0.062	0.004	0.019
8	Reason.for.Leaving	Gang violence	0.122	0.086	0.154	0.768
9	Reason.for.Leaving	Persecution	0.317	0.089	0.000	0.002
10	Reason.for.Leaving	Civil war	0.208	0.086	0.016	0.078
11	Reason.for.Leaving	Invasion	0.272	0.084	0.001	0.006
12	Religion	Agnostic	-0.036	0.062	0.565	1
13	Religion	Muslim	0.410	0.070	0.000	0.000

A.4 Descriptive Statistics

A.5 Robustness Checks and Heterogeneous Effects

To explore variations in subgroup attitudes, I follow the approach outlined by Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley (2020) which estimates marginal means for different relevant groups. The advantage of this method is that it can help us avoid the issues associated with comparing AMCEs across subgroups that depend on estimation from the same baseline.

Table 2: AMCE, U.S. Sample (Compared to baseline levels- Rating Outcome

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	P-value	Adjusted P-value
1	Age	38	-0.02	0.04	0.72	1
2	Age	61	-0.18	0.05	0.00	0.00
3	Gender	Female	0.09	0.04	0.02	0.09
4	Language.Fluency	Broken	0.13	0.05	0.01	0.06
5	Language.Fluency	Fluent	0.44	0.05	0.00	0.00
6	Occupation	Doctor	0.35	0.05	0.00	0.00
7	Occupation	Teacher	0.06	0.05	0.20	0.98
8	Reason.for.Leaving	Civil war	0.56	0.07	0.00	0.00
9	Reason.for.Leaving	Persecution	0.44	0.07	0.00	0.00
10	Reason.for.Leaving	Gang violence	0.38	0.08	0.00	0.00
11	Reason.for.Leaving	Invasion	0.61	0.07	0.00	0.00
12	Religion	Agnostic	-0.10	0.05	0.03	0.16
13	Religion	Muslim	-0.28	0.05	0.00	0.00

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics - United States

Gender		Employment	
Female	0.49	Part-time	0.18
Male	0.5	Full-time	0.51
Neither	0.01	Unemployed but not seeking opportunities	0.06
Ideology		Unemployed and seeking opportunities	0.13
Liberal	0.39	Retired	0.12
Conservative	0.36	Race	
Neither	0.25	African-American	0.14
Partisanship		Asian	0.07
Democrat Party	0.4	Hispanic	0.08
Republican Party	0.34	White	0.61
Independent	0.26	Others	0.1

Variable	Min.	1st Quarter	Median	Mean	3rd Quarter	Max.
Age	19	33	48	46.41	59	95
Education	1	13	16	15.23	16	25
Gender Norms	1	2.2	3	2.933	3.8	5
Projected Patriotism	1	2.4	2.8	2.877	3.4	5

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics - Turkey

Gender		Employment	
Female	0.54	Part-time	0.04
Male	0.46	Full-time	0.61
Ideology		Unemployed but not seeking opportunities	0.07
Left	0.25	Unemployed and seeking opportunities	0.14
Right	0.25	Retired	0.14
Neither	0.5	Race	
Partisanship		Turkish	0.85
Government	0.24	Kurdish	0.11
Opposition	0.35	Arab	0.006
Neither	0.41	Others	0.04

Variable	Min.	1st Quarter	Median	Mean	3rd Quarter	Max.
Age	18	31	40	40.85	50	67
Education	2	12	15	13.97	16	30
Gender Norms	1	2.8	3.6	3.495	4.2	5
Projected Patriotism	1	3.2	4	3.87	4.6	5

Table 5: Factor Loadings - United States

United States	Factor 1	Factor 2
Q1	0.371	0.644
Q2	0.709	0.238
Q3	0.154	0.593
Q4	0.444	0.418
Q5	0.636	0.418
Cumulative Var	0.253	0.563

Turkey	Factor 1	Factor 2
Q1	0.345	0.733
Q2	0.583	0.456
Q3	0.281	0.724
Q4	0.627	0.27
Q5	0.473	0.374
Cumulative Var	0.298	0.528

Figure 5: Correlation plots

United States

Turkey

Figure 6: Distribution plots

United States

Turkey

**Figure 7:** Results from the conjoint experiment on general sample with rating outcomes, where .2 is used as a threshold to exclude speeder respondents. Plots show the effect of each treatment compared to baseline condition for each attribute on the left. The rating outcome takes values from 1 to 7, higher values indicating more support for the migrant profile to be admitted. The forced choice outcome is binary, 1 meaning the migrant profile should be admitted, while meaning the migrant profile should not be admitted. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level and Bonferroni adjustment is used on confidence intervals.


Turkey

United States

Figure 8: Results from the conjoint experiment on general sample with rating outcomes, where .3 is used as a threshold to exclude speeder respondents. Plots show the effect of each treatment compared to baseline condition for each attribute on the left. The rating outcome takes values from 1 to 7, higher values indicating more support for the migrant profile to be admitted. The forced choice outcome is binary, 1 meaning the migrant profile should be admitted, while meaning the migrant profile should not be admitted. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level and Bonferroni adjustment is used on confidence intervals.


Turkey

United States

Figure 9: Results from the conjoint experiment on Low Projected Patriotism sample with rating outcomes, where .2 is used as a threshold to exclude speeder respondents. Plots show the effect of each treatment compared to baseline condition for each attribute on the left. The rating outcome takes values from 1 to 7, higher values indicating more support for the migrant profile to be admitted. The forced choice outcome is binary, 1 meaning the migrant profile should be admitted, while meaning the migrant profile should not be admitted. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level and Bonferroni adjustment is used on confidence intervals.


Turkey

United States

Figure 10: Results from the conjoint experiment on High Projected Patriotism sample with rating outcomes, where .2 is used as a threshold to exclude speeder respondents. Plots show the effect of each treatment compared to baseline condition for each attribute on the left. The rating outcome takes values from 1 to 7, higher values indicating more support for the migrant profile to be admitted. The forced choice outcome is binary, 1 meaning the migrant profile should be admitted, while meaning the migrant profile should not be admitted. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level and Bonferroni adjustment is used on confidence intervals.

Turkey

United States

Figure 11: Results from the conjoint experiment on Low Projected Patriotism sample with rating outcomes, where .3 is used as a threshold to exclude speeder respondents. Plots show the effect of each treatment compared to baseline condition for each attribute on the left. The rating outcome takes values from 1 to 7, higher values indicating more support for the migrant profile to be admitted. The forced choice outcome is binary, 1 meaning the migrant profile should be admitted, while meaning the migrant profile should not be admitted. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level and Bonferroni adjustment is used on confidence intervals.


Turkey

United States

Figure 12: Results from the conjoint experiment on High Projected Patriotism sample with rating outcomes, where .3 is used as a threshold to exclude speeder respondents. Plots show the effect of each treatment compared to baseline condition for each attribute on the left. The rating outcome takes values from 1 to 7, higher values indicating more support for the migrant profile to be admitted. The forced choice outcome is binary, 1 meaning the migrant profile should be admitted, while meaning the migrant profile should not be admitted. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level and Bonferroni adjustment is used on confidence intervals.

Figure 13: Results from the conjoint experiment on Low Projected Patriotism sample with rating outcomes, where 3 is used as an alternative threshold to instead of average of Projected Patriotism measure. Plots show the effect of each treatment compared to baseline condition for each attribute on the left. The rating outcome takes values from 1 to 7, higher values indicating more support for the migrant profile to be admitted. The forced choice outcome is binary, 1 meaning the migrant profile should be admitted, while meaning the migrant profile should not be admitted. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level and Bonferroni adjustment is used on confidence intervals.

Turkey

United States

Figure 14: Results from the conjoint experiment on High Projected Patriotism sample with rating outcomes, where 3 is used as an alternative threshold to instead of average of Projected Patriotism measure. Plots show the effect of each treatment compared to baseline condition for each attribute on the left. The rating outcome takes values from 1 to 7, higher values indicating more support for the migrant profile to be admitted. The forced choice outcome is binary, 1 meaning the migrant profile should be admitted, while meaning the migrant profile should not be admitted. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level and Bonferroni adjustment is used on confidence intervals.

Turkey

United States

Figure 15: Results from the conjoint experiment on general sample with rating and forced choice outcomes, Turkey. Plots show the effect of each treatment compared to baseline condition for each attribute on the left. The rating outcome takes values from 1 to 7, higher values indicating more support for the migrant profile to be admitted. The forced choice outcome is binary, 1 meaning the migrant profile should be admitted, while meaning the migrant profile should not be admitted. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level and Bonferroni adjustment is used on confidence intervals.

Rating

Forced Choice

Figure 16: Results from the conjoint experiment on general sample with rating and forced choice outcomes, United States. Plots show the effect of each treatment compared to baseline condition for each attribute on the left. The rating outcome takes values from 1 to 7, higher values indicating more support for the migrant profile to be admitted. The forced choice outcome is binary, 1 meaning the migrant profile should be admitted, while meaning the migrant profile should not be admitted. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level and Bonferroni adjustment is used on confidence intervals.

Rating

Forced Choice

Figure 17: Marginal Mean Differences: Gender - Turkey Sample

Forced Choice

Rating

Figure 18: Marginal Mean Differences: Age - Turkey Sample

Forced Choice

Marginal Mean Difference, Turkey (Forced Choice)

Age — Above average — Below average

Rating

Marginal Mean Difference, Turkey (Rating)

Age — Above average — Below average

Figure 19: Marginal Mean Differences: Employment - Turkey Sample

Forced Choice

Marginal Mean Difference, Turkey (Forced Choice)

Employment → Employed → Unemployed

Rating

Marginal Mean Difference, Turkey (Rating)

Employment → Employed → Unemployed

Figure 20: Marginal Mean Differences: Education - Turkey Sample

Forced Choice

Marginal Mean Difference, Turkey (Forced Choice)

Education   •— College Degree   •— non-College Degree

Rating

Marginal Mean Difference, Turkey (Rating)

Education   •— College Degree   •— non-College Degree

Figure 21: Marginal Mean Differences: Ethnicity - Turkey Sample

Forced Choice

Marginal Mean Difference, Turkey (Forced Choice)

Ethnicity —•— Turkish —•— non-Turkish

Rating

Marginal Mean Difference, Turkey (Rating)

Ethnicity —•— Turkish —•— non-Turkish

Figure 22: Marginal Mean Differences: Gender Norms - Turkey Sample

Forced Choice

Rating

Figure 23: Marginal Mean Differences: Partisanship - Turkey Sample

Forced Choice

Rating

Figure 24: Marginal Mean Differences: Projected Patriotism - Turkey Sample

Forced Choice

Projected Patriotism ●— High ●— Low

Rating

Projected Patriotism ●— High ●— Low

Figure 25: Marginal Mean Differences: Gender - U.S. Sample

Forced Choice

Rating

Figure 26: Marginal Mean Differences: Age - U.S. Sample

Forced Choice

Age — Above average — Below average

Rating

Age — Above average — Below average

Figure 27: Marginal Mean Differences: Employment - U.S. Sample

Forced Choice

Rating

Figure 28: Marginal Mean Differences: Education - U.S. Sample

Forced Choice

Rating

Figure 29: Marginal Mean Differences: Race - U.S. Sample

Forced Choice

Rating

Figure 30: Marginal Mean Differences: Partisanship - U.S. Sample

Forced Choice

Marginal Mean Difference, US (Forced Choice)

Political Stance — Democrat — Republican

Rating

Marginal Mean Difference, US (Rating)

Political Stance — Democrat — Republican

Figure 31: Marginal Mean Differences: Gender Norms - U.S. Sample

Forced Choice

Gender Norms ● Rigid ● Flexible

Rating

Gender Norms ● Rigid ● Flexible

Figure 32: Marginal Mean Differences: Projected Patriotism - U.S. Sample

Forced Choice

Rating

Projected Patriotism Measure: Please state how much do you agree or disagree with each of the statements. (1: Strongly disagree, 5: Strongly agree)

- People who are not Americans should feel loyal to their own country.

- Citizens of other countries should serve their country in any way they can, independent of what their country is.

- I value the importance of non-Americans prioritizing their own country.

- Defending one's country is a noble patriotic duty, and individuals should defend their own country, even if it is against my country.

- No matter what those policies are, people of other countries should support their own national policy. society.

Gender Roles Measure: Please state how much do you agree or disagree with each of the statements. (1: Strongly disagree, 5: Strongly agree)

- Differences between men and women are generalizable and should not be overlooked.

- Men should be responsible for protecting society.

- Men handle crises better than women.

- Some jobs are more suitable for men than for women, and vice versa.

- In general, women are more vulnerable than men due to their nature.